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Liberal Justices' Reliance on
Legislative History:
Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia
Effect
James J. Brudneyt
Corey Ditsleartt
This Article presents a strong case against the conventional wisdom
that legislative history is a "politicized'" resource, invoked
opportunistically by federal judges. The premise that judges regularly rely
on legislative history to promote their preferred policy positions-if true-
should find ample support in the majority opinions of liberal Supreme
Court Justices construing liberal (pro-employee) labor and civil rights
statutes. By analyzing all 320-plus majority opinions in workplace law
authored by eight liberal Justices from 1969-2006, the authors establish
that legislative history reliance is actually associated with a constraining
set of results. When the eight liberal Justices use legislative history as part
of their majority reasoning, they do so to justify a higher proportion of their
pro-employer outcomes than their pro-employee decisions. The authors
explain how liberal Justices use legislative history to illuminate the
contours of complex statutory bargains that often favor conservative or
pro-employer positions. After considering alternative explanations, the
authors conclude that Justices Brennan, Marshall, Souter, Stevens, and
others are willing to follow so frequently a legislative history trail leading
away from their presumed ideological preferences mainly because they
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have invoked this interpretive resource in principled fashion. The Article
also describes how, in the face of Justice Scalia's fervent opposition to
legislative history, liberal Justices since 1986 have opted not to rely on that
resource in a series of pro-employer majorities that Scalia joins. One
result of the liberals' strategic restraint is that their use of legislative
history in the remaining (mostly pro-employee) majority opinions appears
more ideological than it was before Scalia joined the Court. Intriguingly,
Justice Scalia's strong resistance to legislative history when used by liberal
Justices does not extend to majorities authored by his conservative
colleagues. Scalia seems prepared to give these conservative colleagues
more of a free ride: he is as likely to join their majorities, or vote for their
results, when they rely on legislative history as when they do not.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Critics of legislative history have long maintained that it lacks
neutrality as an interpretive resource. Unlike the dictionary or the canons of
construction, committee reports and floor statements are produced by
partisans-actors with a stake in the legislative contest to which they are
contributing. Legislative history skeptics worry that this political
dimension creates a risk of judicial misuse on two levels. Members of
Congress or their staffs may craft statements in the legislative record with
an eye toward manipulating or misleading judges as to the meaning of text.
Moreover, judges reviewing the abundant legislative commentary from bill
proponents and opponents may selectively invoke portions of this record to
help justify their preferred policy result.
Concerns over the politicized nature of legislative history reliance'
have special resonance with respect to federal labor and employment law.
Congress's unidirectional legislative goal in the field of workplace law has
been to augment employee protections and thereby improve terms and
conditions of employment.' From the late 1930s through the early 1990s,
liberal coalitions in the House and Senate coordinated passage of more than
a dozen major employee protection statutes.' Leading members of these
1. Judicial reliance on legislative history has also been criticized as conceptually incoherent (the
legislature's intention or purpose is at best deeply muddled and at worst unknowable) and
constitutionally inadequate (on separation of powers and legislative supremacy grounds). Those
criticisms, which have been discussed elsewhere in some detail, are not addressed in this article. See
generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222-24, 230-38 (1994);
Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1924-35 (2006); James J.
Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling
Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 41-47 (1994).
2. Congress's agenda in the workplace law arena has on occasion departed from this
redistributive focus. Provisions in the Taft-Hartley and Landrum Griffin Acts, which restricted
employee rights to picket and union rights to impede commerce, reflect congressional intent that was
primarily conservative rather than liberal as we are using those terms. Nonetheless, Congress's
workplace law statutes have overwhelmingly sided with employees in regulating conflict between
employer and employee interests. By contrast, federal legislation in certain other areas-such as
securities law or tax law-is less easily classified as liberal or conservative. See, e.g., Margaret V.
Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50
SMU L. REV. 777, 784-91 (1997) (discussing the pro-regulation nature of the 1933 Securities Act and
1934 Securities Exchange Act); Michael A. Perrino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State
Securities Fraud Causes ofAction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 280-98 (1998) (discussing the anti-regulation
nature of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); Bernard Wolfman et al., The Behavior of
Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 286-89, 320-25 (1973) (analyzing ways
in which the pro-regulatory nature of federal tax law is viewed by one Justice as, at times, liberal and, at
other times, conservative).
3. These statutes include the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act in
the 1930s; the Portal-to-Portal Act in the 1940s; the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act in the 1960s; the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act in the 1970s; the Polygraph Protection Act and the Worker
Adjustment Retraining Notification Act in the 1980s; and the Americans with Disabilities Act and
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enacting coalitions were well situated to include statements that purported
to explain Congress's specific intentions or general purposes, thereby
imbuing key legislative history materials with a liberal spin.
In addition, the Supreme Court has been heavily influenced by liberal
Justices since the early 1960s. The voting records of Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, and Souter, among others, reflect a broad tendency to
support the legal positions taken by individual employees, racial minorities,
women, unions, and retirees-the principal beneficiaries of Congress's
employee protection statutes. When authoring majority opinions, these
Justices might be inclined to magnify their policy preferences by picking
out their friends from among the crowded assortment of statements
contained in the legislative record.4  Such "friendly" pro-employee
statements are likely to be especially visible or salient in the legislative
record accompanying workplace law statutes.
In short, the premise that Supreme Court Justices systemically use
legislative history to promote or magnify their preferred policy positions-
if true-should find ample support in the majority opinions of liberal
Justices construing liberal statutes. This Article explores the assumption
that liberals on the Court will use legislative history to help justify liberal or
pro-employee results significantly more often than they do to support
conservative or pro-employer results. It does so by focusing on more than
300 majority opinions in the field of workplace law authored by eight
liberal Justices5 who have served for at least ten years on the Burger,
Rehnquist, or Roberts Courts. Not surprisingly, we found that the eight
liberals-Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer-rely on legislative history as a group far more often
than their eight conservative counterparts. 6
More surprisingly, however, we determined that for the eight liberals,
the relationship between pro-employee outcomes and legislative history
usage is not significant.7 If anything, these Justices' legislative history
reliance is associated more often with outcomes to which they would likely
Family and Medical Leave Act in the 1990s. Many of these regulatory schemes have been updated and
expanded by Congress as additional enactments.
4. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. RFv_ 195, 214 (1983) (quoting her colleague Judge Leventhal's
observation that citing legislative history is akin to "looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends").
5. See Part I B., infra, discussing the classification of Justices as liberal or conservative for our
purposes, based on the Spaeth Supreme Court database.
6. The eight conservative Justices with at least ten years of service between 1969 and 2006 are
Justices Burger, Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. We also discuss
conservative Justices' reliance on legislative history in certain settings, in an effort to illuminate or
contextualize findings regarding the eight liberals. Our focus, however, is on the liberal Justices and
how they make use of the legislative history that accompanies and explains this abundant assortment of
pro-employee statutes.
7. We refer here to statistical significance, as described infra at note 48.
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be ideologically opposed. When liberal Justices use legislative history as
part of their majority reasoning, they do so to justify more than half of their
pro-employer opinions but just under half of their pro-employee outcomes.
Further evidence of this moderating association is that majority opinions
authored by liberal Justices reach liberal outcomes 30% more often than
conservative results when not relying on legislative history, but the liberal-
conservative outcome differential declines to 21% when the majority
opinion's reasoning includes legislative history. A link between legislative
history reliance and more moderate outcomes is observable in the
aggregated majority opinions of the liberals as a group, and also in the
majorities authored individually by Justices Brennan, Marshall, White,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter.
On the other hand, we found that since 1985, this moderating
association has waned among the cohort of liberal Justices. During his final
years on the Court, Justice White-who had previously relied on legislative
history disproportionately to help justify pro-employer results-invoked
legislative history in only rare instances. In addition, the two most recently
appointed liberals, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, have reached pro-
employee results in majorities that rely on legislative history substantially
more often than in majorities that do not. Our data for the eight
conservative Justices shows that these Justices increasingly rely on
legislative history to support their preferred policy outcomes. Use of
legislative history by the "older" conservatives-Justices Burger, Stewart,
and Powell-is linked to more liberal or pro-employee results; this, again,
is a distinctly moderating association, also observable in the pre-1986
majorities authored by Justice Rehnquist. By contrast, legislative history
reliance by two of the "newer" conservatives-Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy-is strongly associated with results favorable to employers.8
We thus have uncovered evidence to suggest that both principle and
politics may be at work in the way the liberal Justices rely on legislative
history, and we examine some implications of both sets of findings. With
respect to the role of principle, a key question is why legislative history
accompanying liberal, pro-employee statutes is used so often by liberal
Justices to support conservative, pro-employer outcomes. Based on a
review of some sixty pro-employer majority opinions authored by the
liberal group of Justices, we have identified three categories of legislative
history regularly invoked to defend conservative interpretations of these
essentially pro-employee laws.
8. Two other newer conservatives, Justices Scalia and Thomas, virtually never rely on legislative
history when writing majority opinions. Their occasional reliance on legislative history in dissents is
associated with pro-employer results. The two newest conservatives, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, have not been on the Court long enough to allow for detailed analyses regarding their legislative
history reliance.
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First, liberal Justices use legislative history to amplify or unpack the
meaning of employer defenses or exemptions built into a statute. Second,
the liberals rely on legislative history to establish the existence or details of
a compromise on the issue being reviewed. Finally, they use legislative
history to demonstrate that the legal position identified with employees and
their supporters has overreached in its claims.
In our view, the liberal Justices' repeated use of these three categories
to explain pro-employer outcomes reveals judicial use of legislative history
to be deliberative and coherent in important ways that legislative history
skeptics have not adequately recognized. We consider possible alternative
explanations for the moderating tilt associated with liberals' legislative
history usage, including the impact of majority opinion assignments and the
prospect that liberals may be pursuing complex strategic motives when they
use legislative history in these settings. Although such factors may play a
supplemental role, we conclude that they do not detract from the importance
of the three principled categories.
With regard to the possible role of politics, an important inquiry is why
both liberal and conservative Justices after 1985 have relied on legislative
history more often to justify or explain what would seem to be their
preferred policy results. We suggest two ways in which Justice Scalia's
fervently expressed opposition to legislative history as an interpretive
resource may have shifted the institutional dynamic for legislative history
usage by stimulating strategic behavior on the part of some of his
colleagues. This "Scalia Effect" may make other Justices appear more
ideological in their approach to legislative history, primarily because of the
circumstances in which liberals opt not to invoke the resource, although
also because of when conservative Justices choose to use it.
First, liberal Justices who wish to secure Justice Scalia's unqualified
support have declined to invoke legislative history in a subset of more than
twenty pro-employer majority opinions that he has joined. It is striking that
for three-fifths of these pro-employer majorities eschewing legislative
history, the winning party's briefs include-and often feature
prominently-legislative history arguments. By not resorting to readily
available legislative history justifications, liberal Justices may be ensuring
Justice Scalia's full endorsement for these decisions; the remaining
majorities that do rely on legislative history consequently take on a more
distinctly pro-employee complexion.
Second, conservative Justices aware of Justice Scalia's outspoken
resistance may confine their use of legislative history, invoking it primarily
to anticipate or counter legislative history arguments advanced by liberal
Justices in dissent. Virtually every non-unanimous majority opinion
favoring employers in which a conservative Justice relies on legislative
history also includes legislative history reliance by a dissenting liberal
Justice. Justice Scalia joins all but one of these pro-employer majorities,
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suggesting he may be giving his conservative colleagues a free ride on their
use of legislative history in these circumstances.
Part I summarizes the current debate over whether legislative history is
inherently unreliable because of its political nature. Part I also identifies the
dataset we use to examine the Supreme Court's use of legislative history.
Part It presents our central findings regarding the ideological tenor of
legislative history usage by the Court as a whole, by the liberal cohort of
Justices, and by the liberal Justices individually. Part III pursues key
aspects of our findings in doctrinal and behavioral terms, analyzing certain
illustrative majority opinions and invoking social science and institutional
perspectives on how the Court operates.
II.
THE DEBATE AND THE DATASET
A. Legislative History as a Politicized Asset?
1. Opportunism at the Creation Stage
Pivotal players in the lawmaking process-congressional staff and
lobbyists as well as Senators and Representatives-recognize that judges
are willing to rely on legislative history materials as an aid to construing
statutory text. Such materials are produced by a relatively small number of
participants, who operate outside the more formal and costly processes
required for the enactment of statutory language.9 In this setting, concerns
have arisen that legislative history will too often include explanations or
assertions supporting a policy outcome that was not addressed, achieved, or
even attainable in the text itself.'0
Legal academics and judges describing such public choice-related
concerns refer to two troubling institutional features of legislative history
creation. One is that congressional committees-the source of the most
influential legislative history-tend to be preference outliers. Their reports
advance general positions and specific constructions that are more extreme
or less balanced than what a hypothetical median legislator would believe to
be contained in the accompanying text." The other is that congressional
9. See generally Brudney, supra note 1, at 21-26 (discussing opportunity costs within the
legislative process, notably the constraints on time and political capital that limit Congress's ability to
enact new laws).
to. See KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 181 (1999); John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 687-88 (1997).
II. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 311 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE ET AL.]. See
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 643-44 (1990) (discussing
possible strategic planting of legislative history by the House committee chair with regard to the
Endangered Species Act); Barry Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of
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staffers-the authors of virtually all legislative history-understand that
members rarely read the committee or floor commentaries drafted by their
underlings. Accordingly, staffers can revel in the "heady feeling"' 12 that
stems from having subtly altered the meaning of textual arrangements
previously negotiated by the legislators. 3
The public choice account of opportunistic behavior by the key
producers of legislative history has not gone unchallenged. Some scholars
suggest that committee-approved legislation generally reflects the policy
preferences of the chamber as a whole,'4 and others contend that committee
actors are adequately constrained by whistleblowing and its related
consequences.' 5  Members know they must depend on colleagues'
representations at the committee stage because the accuracy of committee-
based information is integral to moving Congress's agenda. Moreover, as
repeat players with long-term reputational interests, committee leaders
know that their statements about a bill's specific or general objectives will
be monitored by minority committee members and also by the chamber
majority. 6
As for the role of staff, it may be more reasonable to view them
primarily as faithful agents implementing their bosses' directives.
Congressional staff are recruited and hired for their congruence of
viewpoints and loyalty as well as for their expertise and judgment, and they
will therefore typically reflect or reinforce their member's positions and
values. 7 Further, considerations of political accountability, sharpened by
Congress; or Why Legislators, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 148-
52 (1988) (discussing committee members as significantly more likely than an average Senator or
Representative to support the interest groups active within committee's jurisdiction).
12. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also In re Sinclair,
870 F. 2d 1340, 1345 (7th Cit. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., speculating on a staffer's role in manipulation of
legislative history).
13. See generally ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 11, at 311 ; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History
and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1295, 1310 (1990).
14. See, e.g., Keith Krehbiel & Douglas Rivers, The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application
to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1151, 1168 (1988); Thomas W. Gilligan &
Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI.
531, 557-58 (1990); Forest Maltzman, Maintaining Congressional Committees: Sources of Member
Support, 23 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 197, 201, 210-12 (1998).
15. See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 182.
16. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 11, at 311. See also WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL
PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 106 (7th ed. 2007) (describing committee reports as "directed
primarily at House and Senate members" and as "the principal official means of communicating a
committee decision to the entire chamber").
17. See, e.g., Barbara S. Romzek & Jennifer A. Utter, Congressional Legislative Staff Political
Professionals or Clerks?, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1251, 1259, 1265-66, 1268-71 (1997); Susan Webb
Hammond, Recent Research on Legislative Staffs, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 543, 545-46, 570 (1996);
HARRISON W. FOX, JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS 148, 153 (1977); David E.
Price, Professionals and "'Enterpreneurs ": Staff Orientations and Policy Making on Three Senate
Committees, 33 J. POL. 316, 320-25 (1971).
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the prospect of embarrassing media coverage, effectively encourage
diligence by members when overseeing staff performance.
Still, even absent evidence of widespread abuse, skeptics worry that
the known fact of judicial reliance on legislative history subjects courts to
deception. One appellate jurist has opined that legislators are in effect
"encouraged to salt the legislative record with unilateral interpretations of
statutory provisions they were unable to persuade their colleagues to
accept."'" Another has referred to legislative history as "clues [that] are
slanted, drafted by the staff and perhaps by private interest groups." 9
These worries arguably take on added weight with respect to the field
of labor and employment law. From the New Deal onward, the House and
Senate labor committees have been more internally partisan than many
other committees, and labor committee composition has often been to the
left of the median member."0 These committees have generated a series of
major employee protection bills: some were enacted essentially as reported
by the committee although others underwent modifications on the floor.2'
It has been suggested that the legislative histories accompanying at least
some of these bills did not match the policy inclinations or judgments of the
chamber as a whole.22
If key liberal committee members and their staffs have been successful
in reshaping the legislative record to support their own preferences, one
might anticipate that pro-employee explanations or elaborations would be
reflected in Supreme Court decisions invoking that record. We examine
this preliminary hypothesis-that the Court's overall reliance on legislative
history is associated with liberal results-in Tables 1 and 2 below.
2. Opportunism at the Interpretation Stage
The concerns expressed above portray judges as unsuspecting victims,
prone to be misled by the deceptive slant of a legislative record. Of course,
Supreme Court Justices are not generally viewed as such naive or
18. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 474 v. N.L.R.B., 814 F.2d 697, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Buckley, J., concurring).
19. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994).
20. See generally Richard F. Fenno Jr., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES, 62, 74, 78, 83-84, 158,
169-70, 234-42 (1973); John Londregan & James M. Snyder, Jr., Comparing Committee and Floor
Preferences, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 233,243,249 (1994).
21. For examples of major provisions created in the course of floor debate, see Title I of LMRDA
(Senate floor); sex discrimination prohibitions of Title VII (House floor).
22. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL L. REV. 613, 644-49, 657-58 (1991); Daniel B.
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives
on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1474-98 (2003). See
generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 154-56 (1998) (discussing
distinct position of congressional committees with respect to civil rights policy preferences during
1970s).
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inexperienced figures. They are nominated and confirmed based on their
considerable background as judges, lawyers, or policymakers, as well as on
their articulated judicial philosophies. This experience is thought to
generate both doctrinal sophistication and a fairly developed set of
ideological predispositions. One might therefore expect that Justices whose
backgrounds indicate an identification with the positions of employees,
unions, or civil rights claimants would themselves be favorably inclined,
even if subconsciously, toward a legislative record supportive of those
groups. Conversely, one might assume that Justices whose experiences
suggest alignment with employers and the business community would have
less enthusiasm for invoking a legislative record tilted toward employee
interests, or would sift that record for evidence supporting employers' legal
positions.
This leads into a second area of concern about legislative history as a
political asset: that it provides judges the opportunity to engage in strategic
behavior. Statutes are typically the result of legislative bargaining, and a
prevailing coalition will include members whose support for the final bill
language reflects differing priorities and even distinct objectives. The
plethora of legislative record materials produced by coalition members
(including staff, interested private parties, and perhaps executive branch
personnel) is likely to express a nuanced range of perspectives as to what
the proposed law is meant to accomplish.
Subsequently, judges exercising interpretive discretion may invoke this
legislative history in ways that favor the priorities of some coalition
members over others, or even that prefer positions espoused by members
outside the coalition. 3 Their stated rationale for such exercises of
discretion would likely be that the history supports what the judges believe
to be the better-reasoned legal position. But legislative history skeptics fear
that what is selected as persuasive evidence will tend to comport with a
judge's own preferred policy outcome, and that such an accommodation is
too readily secured given the choices available to judges from a richly
diverse legislative record.24
Legislative history proponents have responded to concerns that judges
engage-consciously or not-in such strategic behavior. There is a broadly
recognized hierarchy of legislative history sources that operates as an initial
constraint on judicial discretion. Conference reports, standing committee
reports, and explanatory floor statements by bill managers or sponsors are
clustered near the top in terms of their presumptively persuasive force,
while legislative inaction, statements by nonlegislative drafters, and post-
23. See Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 441,
447 (1990).
24. See GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 181; Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History
Be an Impeachable Offense? 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998).
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enactment history are arrayed close to the bottom.25  Beyond these
guidelines, judges are effectively pressured to consider on a case-by-case
basis whether the legislative record materials are sufficiently accessible,
relevant, and reliable to be construed as convincing evidence of what
Congress understood it was approving.26 In deciding such matters, and in
defending their decisions against dissenting colleagues, judges generally
explain that certain statements should sensibly be construed as part of a
broader understanding among legislators, based on the identity of the
speaker, the nature and visibility of her presentation, or the reasoned
elaboration contained in her remarks.27 These factors vary from one setting
to the next, just as there are context-specific variations in the applicability
of dictionary definitions or language canons.
Nonetheless, some regard these constraints that channel interpretive
discretion as incapable of controlling judges who inevitably bring their own
normative vantage points to a legislative record replete with both aspiration
and self-promotion. Skeptics point to the frequency with which majority
and dissenting opinions at the Supreme Court disagree as to the meaning of
legislative history." In the labor and employment law area, where
Congress has regularly acted to enhance employee protections, but where
the scope of those protections is not always clear, disagreements between
liberal and conservative Justices are common.
One of the most controversial examples can be seen in Steelworkers v.
Weber," in which Justices Brennan and Rehnquist adopted radically
different viewpoints as to whether the Congress that enacted Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act meant to prohibit voluntary affirmative action plans.
The Brennan majority opinion determined that committee reports and floor
debate revealed an intent to avoid regulating voluntary efforts to redress
glaring racial imbalance in a workforce.3" The Rehnquist dissent insisted in
over twenty-five pages that the law's chief sponsors and supporters could
not have been clearer in identifying all such race-conscious plans as
prohibited.3
25. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 11, at 310-317; GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 173-175.
26. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 11, at 304, 310; Brudney, supra note I, at 75-82.
27. See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court,
2000 WIs. L. REv. 205, 230-32 (2000) (discussing the common sense approach of imputing institutional
intent); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION 981-82, 1000-01, 1020-21 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the hierarchy of legislative
history resources in Supreme Court decisions based on which legislative record evidence is likely to be
viewed as authoritative among reasonably attentive congressional colleagues).
28. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 89-115 (2006); Kozinski,
supra note 24, at 817-19 (pointing out areas where the courts may differ in the interpretation and use of
legislative history).
29. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
30. Id. at 202-08.
31. Id. at 229-54.
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The majority's use of legislative history in Weber has been viewed as
an illustration of how liberal Justices can make the record say what they
want it to,32  but there are less-prominent instances of analogous
disagreements. When reviewing the history of a liberal workplace statute,
conservative Justices authoring pro-employer dissents have construed
specific legislative record statements to mean the exact opposite of what the
liberal majority has stated that they mean. 33  Pro-employer dissents also
have relied on a separate piece of legislative record evidence than the ones
invoked by the liberal majority, 34 and they have concluded that portions of
the same record reveal an overarching purpose at odds with the evidence of
specific intent discussed by the liberal majority.35
If these decisions are representative, one would expect liberal Justices'
legislative history reliance in workplace law to be associated with liberal
pro-employee results substantially more often than with conservative pro-
employer outcomes. We examine this central hypothesis and related
questions in Tables 3 through 6 below, based on Supreme Court workplace
law decisions over thirty-seven years.
B. The Dataset of Workplace Law Decisions
Our dataset consists of every Supreme Court case with a published
merits opinion addressing some aspect of the employment relationship,
from the start of the Burger Court in fall 1969 through the 2005-06 term.36
This universe features 578 decisions that implicate one or more federal
statutes or, in rare instances, matters of federal common law. 37  The
32. See, e.g., Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 22, at 1517-21.
33. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 292-93 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from Justice Brennan's majority opinion construing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
34. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 606 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from Justice Souter's majority opinion construing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
35. See Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 426-28 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting
from Justice Brennan's opinion construing the Labor Management Relations Act).
36. For a detailed discussion of how we assembled our dataset, see James J. Brudney & Corey
Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15-
29 (2005). The complete dataset and codebook are available on the web at
http://www.psci.unt.edu/Ditslear/LHdata.htm.
37. The dataset through the first term of the Roberts Court consists of 658 decisions altogether,
including 80 presenting issues of constitutional law that do not implicate federal statutes. Although we
have included these "pure" constitutional decisions as a distinct category in other articles making use of
the dataset, we omit them here. The content and function of "constitutional history" (e.g., convention
proceedings, The Federalist Papers, state ratification debates) have been analyzed differently from
legislative history by certain current Justices and also by legal scholars. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Should the Court Read the Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1301 (1998); Note: Justice Scalia 's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation:
How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DuKE L. J. 160 (1990). We determined that these differences, along
with the Court's relatively infrequent reliance on constitutional history (roughly 10% of the 80 cases,
compared with over 40% reliance on legislative history for the 578 statutory cases) warranted excluding
the pure constitutional decisions from our analysis in this setting.
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decisions address not only well-trodden fields such as union-management
relations and race or gender discrimination, but also a wide range of other
subject areas including safety and health, minimum wage and overtime
standards, retirement benefits, discrimination based on age or disability, and
even employment-related disputes arising in connection with tax, criminal,
or immigration law. Workplace law cases have formed a reasonably stable
portion of the Court's docket since the mid 1970s, about one-sixth of all
merits decisions when calculated at three-year intervals. 3 8
We focus here on the Court's use of legislative history as an
interpretive resource to help explain or justify its decisions. The Supreme
Court ordinarily relies on committee reports, floor debates, hearings, and
other legislative record evidence for one of two reasons: to help resolve
textual ambiguity, or to confirm and reinforce apparent plain meaning. 9
The Court makes regular use of other interpretive resources as well, such as
the plain meaning of statutory language, the Court's own precedent, the
canons of construction, and agency deference. We do not attempt to
prioritize among the various resources typically cited as helpful in
contributing to the Court's result.4" Judicial reasoning is highly situation-
specific, and any effort to rank the Court's multiple and often
complementary justifications for its holdings would simply be too
subjective. For our purposes, so long as legislative history is expressly
identified and discussed by the majority as either an affirmatively probative
or a determining factor, we conclude that it was relied upon by the Court.4 '
In order to address the concern that legislative history is more of a
political than a neutral interpretive resource, we consider in some detail the
relationship between the Court's reliance on legislative history and the
ideological direction of its majority opinions. We have classified all 578
decisions based on whether the Court's outcome favored unions or
38. To limit the effects of yearly fluctuations in the Supreme Court's workplace law caseload, we
compared the number of cases for three-year periods.
39. See generally Brudney, supra note 1, at 42 n.172 and sources cited therein. The Court on
occasion invokes legislative history for a third reason-to assist in avoiding an absurd or
unconstitutional result. See, e.g., NLRB v. The Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 504-06 (1979).
40. Apart from legislative history, we have coded for nine other interpretive resources on which
the Justices rely with some frequency: (i) the plain or ordinary meaning of text, (ii) dictionaries, (iii)
language canons, (iv) legislative purpose, (v) legislative inaction, (vi) Supreme Court precedent, (viii)
common law precedent, (viii) substantive canons, and (ix) agency deference. The Court's opinions
almost always rely on at least two resources, and the vast majority recognize three or more.
41. When a majority opinion invokes legislative history only in a deflecting way, i.e., to dismiss
the value ascribed to it by a lower court, a party's brief, or a dissenting Justice, we do not regard this as
positive reliance. Our conclusion that such deflecting references are not integral to the majority's
affirmative reasoning process rests on our decision to distinguish between substantive uses of an
interpretive resource that an opinion's author supports and substantive uses the author rejects as
unpersuasive, inconclusive, or incorrect. Moreover, to examine most clearly the relationship between
judicial reasoning and judicial outcomes, we chose to analyze resources as they are used to advance
results endorsed by the majority. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 36, at 25-26.
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employees (liberal) as opposed to employers (conservative).12 In addition,
we have identified each of the twenty-one Justices who served during this
period as either liberal or conservative.
In identifying the ideological orientation of the Justices, we relied on
voting scores derived from a database compiled by Professor Harold
Spaeth, a well-recognized scholar of Supreme Court voting behavior.43 By
combining a number of Spaeth's designated issue areas, we are able to
provide a distinctively formulated subject matter field that is comparable to
our own workplace law dataset." Based on the voting scores for these
issue areas, we identify eleven Justices as conservative and ten as liberal.45
42. For about 8% of the 578 cases (forty-four total), we were unable to identify the Court's
decision as liberal or conservative. These involved either decisions that were closely divided in outcome
between employees and employers, or disputes between individual employees and their unions where
the direct policy implications seemed to us too close to call (e.g., allowing a newly elected union
president to discharge appointed business agents who had opposed him in the election, or disciplining an
individual for crossing a picket line during a strike authorized by a majority of the employees when the
individual's conduct violates the union constitution). We coded "reverse discrimination" cases (such as
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)) as liberal if the outcome favored the group
or class that was the primary intended beneficiary of the statutory provision. For further discussion of
our ideological coding of cases, see Brudney, supra note 36, at 18-19.
43. See The Original U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2005 terms (last updated 10-
10-2006) http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL app. 6.1, at 255-60 (1993).
In recent years, political scientists have been experimenting with alternative ways of operationalizing
judicial ideology over time, using more sophisticated statistical methods. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin &
Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002); Michael Bailey & Kelly H. Chang, Comparing
Presidents, Senators, and Justices. Interinstitutional Preference Estimation, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 477
(2001). These measures, however, are derived through the original Spaeth dataset, relying on vote
scores that are still used regularly in the political science field. We chose not to pursue the newer
measures, which are generally oriented toward the universe of all cases rather than a discrete subset of
decisions. We do take account of the changing nature of legislative history reliance overtime, as well as
changes in the approaches taken by individual Justices. See infra tbls. 1-6 and accompanying
discussion.
44. We obtain an ideology score exogenous to our dataset based on each Justice's votes through
the 2005-2006 term (including votes before the 1969 term for eight of the twenty-one) on a subgroup of
issues in the Spaeth data base. These consist of all civil rights issues (Issue variable codes in 200s and
300s), all union-related issues (Issue variable codes 553 to 599), selected government employee and
federal preemption issues (Issue variable codes 432, 435, 503, and 910), and selected economic issues
(Issue variable codes 601, 605, 611, 621, 631, and 636). The civil rights issues are modestly
overinclusive in that they contain cases dealing with voting rights, education, and general poverty law as
well as employment. The combined issue codes are also mildly underinclusive in that certain omitted
codes represent policy areas (for example, First Amendment) that contain some employment-related
subjects. Still, the Spaeth combination of issue codes has substantial overlap with our employment-
based dataset, and in screening out a number of potentially distorting or conflating policy areas (such as
criminal law, judicial power, and natural resources), it provides a distinctive assessment for the
ideological orientations of the Justices.
45. Justices are coded as liberal or conservative by using simple directional analyses keyed to the
proportion of liberal votes in the Spaeth Issue areas. The eleven conservatives (Justices Harlan, Stewart,
Burger, Powell, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Rehnquist, Roberts, and Alito) voted for
individuals (against employer, business, or government-related positions) less than 50% of the time; the
other ten Justices cast pro-individual employee votes in more than 50% of the cases. When relying on
judicial classifications in our analyses, we focus on the eight liberals (Justices Brennan, Marshall, White,
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The Spaeth combination of issue codes provides a useful independent
baseline; at the same time, there is a close correlation between voting
behavior in our dataset and in the larger Spaeth collection of civil rights-
unions-economic-government employee issues.4"
II.
RESULTS
A. Legislative History and Ideology for the Court as a Whole
Preliminarily, we reviewed ideological outcomes in general for our
dataset and found that the decisions over this thirty-seven year period are
fairly evenly divided. There is a slight tilt toward results favoring
Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) and the eight conservatives (those listed above
except for Harlan, Roberts, and Alito) who served ten or more terms between 1969 and 2006.
46. The voting scores listed below reflect the percentage of cases in which a Justice cast votes
favoring the legal position of individuals, employees, or unions; a score above 50% is characterized as
liberal. We present vote scores based on the Spaeth Issue codes side-by-side with scores based on our
own dataset; we include in parentheses the number of ideologically-identified votes cast by each Justice.
Spaeth Issue Codes
78.6% (1154)
77.2% (1611)
68.6% (261)
66.8% (286)
64.2% (385)
61.7% (1115)
58.8% (1141)
57.6% (1511)
48.5% (1109)
42.8% (796)
42.2% (476)
41.3% (779)
39.5% (911)
34.6% (544)
30.6% (1293)
27.7% (343)
86.3% (946)
75.7% (723)
45.5% (626)
36.8% (19)
30.0% (10)
Brudney & Ditslear
76.3% (423)
74.9% (408)
70.0% (139)
63.2% (155)
63.8% (196)
64.4% (514)
62.1% (450)
51.8% (454)
46.9% (201)
46.3% (395)
46.3% (242)
40.9% (307)
37.4% (319)
40.7% (290)
37.7% (570)
41.4% (174)
78.9% (78)
71.4% (21)
47.6% (21)
62.5% (8)
40.0% (5)
For twelve of the sixteen Justices with ten terms or more on the Court, there is less than a 5% difference
between our voting scores and Spaeth's scores. For three Justices (White, Scalia, and Rehnquist) the
difference is between 6% and 10%, and for one Justice (Thomas) it is 14%. Only one of the twenty-one
Justices has a differential that changes his characterization: Justice Roberts' Spaeth "label"
(conservative) is at odds with his voting record in our dataset based on eight workplace law cases in his
initial term.
Marshall
Brennan
Breyer
Ginsburg
Souter
Stevens
Blackmun
White
Stewart
O'Connor
Kennedy
Powell
Burger
Scalia
Rehnquist
Thomas
Douglas
Black
Harlan
Roberts
Alito
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employees; of the 534 cases for which we coded directional outcomes, 282
(53%) were liberal decisions while 252 (47%) were conservative.47
Employees and unions did fare somewhat better when appearing before the
Burger Court than they have since 1986 in the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts; the difference in employee success rates between the two eras
approaches statistical significance. 8
This finding of broad-based ideological neutrality with a liberal tilt,
although seemingly at odds with the Court's more conservative reputation
in recent decades, could be explained by several different factors. As a
threshold matter, disputes that are litigated all the way to the Supreme Court
are likely to raise reasonable legal arguments on both sides, and the win
rates of employee and employer advocates may therefore tend to be
comparable over an extended period.49  Further, in the area of labor and
employment law the business community in recent decades has played a
larger role in presenting the Justices with cases that push the envelope than
it did during the Warren Court era or the early Burger Court years. To the
extent that employers have pursued an ambitious agenda before a Court
they view as relatively sympathetic, their win-loss rate may have suffered as
a consequence.50
Finally, aggregate results keyed simply to outcomes cannot measure
the magnitude or consequences of particular Supreme Court decisions. An
employer win in a major substantive case and an employer loss in a minor
jurisdictional case may carry very different policy implications that our
initial quantitative analysis does not capture. With respect to the Justices'
use of legislative history, we attempt to account for this magnitude factor by
examining results in close cases as a separate category, and also by
reviewing illustrative decisions in doctrinal terms.
47. We classified forty-four of the 578 cases as indeterminate. See supra note 42. In nineteen of
the 578 cases (nine in the Burger Court and ten in the Rehnquist Court), the Court announced its holding
and set forth its principal reasoning in a plurality opinion. We treat these plurality opinions as majorities
for purposes of our analyses.
48. In the Burger era, 56% of decisions were liberal while in the Rehnquist and Roberts eras it has
been 50%; the difference approaches significance (t = .0875). The use of "significant" refers to results
that are statistically significant using either the t-test or the z-test, as appropriate, based on the sample
size. A t-test compares the mean of two data set samples, controlling for the sample size, to determine
whether the difference between the statistics could be due to chance. A result that is significant at the
.05 level (t .05) has no more than a 5% chance of occurring purely as coincidence. R. MARK SIRKIN,
STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 178-89 (1995). We follow the common social science approach
of designating results with a t-value between .05 and .10 as "approaching significance." All statistical
analyses in this Article are run using Stata Version 8.
49. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis:
Learning from Wittman's Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 218-19 (1985); Richard A. Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 179, 190-91 (1987).
50. Conversely, the employee rights community's inclination to pursue new approaches before the
Court has been more subdued in recent decades. See generally Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation
During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J. LAW & POLITICS 639, 681-82 (1993).
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1. Legislative History and Ideology Over Time
We begin by reporting the extent to which the Court as a whole has
relied on legislative history to justify its liberal (pro-employee) and
conservative (pro-employer) holdings. Table 1 presents legislative history
reliance as a proportion of the 282 liberal decisions, the forty-four cases
with indeterminate outcomes, and the 252 conservative decisions reached
from 1969 to 2006. Table 1 includes a similar breakdown for cases decided
during the two basic eras that constitute this thirty-seven year period: the
301 workplace law decisions issued by the Burger Court over seventeen
terms through June 1986, and the 277 workplace law cases resolved by the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts in twenty terms through June 2006.1
Table 1: Ideological Direction of Legislative History (LH)
Reliance Over Time (N=578)
Percentage of All Percentage of Percentage of
Cases Burger Court Rehnquist/RobertsResult
Relying on Cases Relying on Court Cases Relying
LH (N=578) LH (N=301) on LH (N=277)
Liberal 43.6% (282) 53.9% (152) 31.5% (130)
Indeterminate 36.4% (44) 39.3% (28) 31.3% (16)
Conservative 41.7% (252) 52.9% (121) 31.3% (131)
The findings set forth in Table 1 indicate that the Court relies on
legislative history to justify conservative results about as often as liberal
outcomes. For the universe of all 578 cases, the difference between
legislative history's contribution to decisions that favor employees (43.6%)
as opposed to employers (41.7%) is not close to significant. Further,
although Table 1 suggests that overall reliance on legislative history has
declined sharply from the Burger to the Rehnquist/Roberts eras,52 that
decline has not been accompanied by a change in the ideological direction
associated with legislative history reliance. The Burger Court invoked
legislative history a shade more often to help support liberal as opposed to
conservative results (53.9% to 52.9%) and the Court in its reliance since
1986 has established a comparably bare margin favoring liberal outcomes
(31.5% to 31.3%).
51. There are fewer workplace law decisions per term during the Rehnquist/Roberts era (13.9)
than in the Burger era (17.7). This decrease parallels the overall decline in number of decisions per term
for the period since 1986. See generally LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM:
DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 82-84 tbl. 2-11 (3d ed. 2003).
52. See also James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in The Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 222 (2006)
(reporting a significant decrease in legislative history reliance between the Burger and Rehnquist eras).
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 133 2008
134 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 29:1
With respect to the 244 decisions (out of 578) that rely on legislative
history, there is a more noticeable liberal tilt: 50% reach pro-employee
results, 43% have pro-employer outcomes, and 7% are indeterminate. 3
This liberal slant is observable in Burger Court decisions relying on
legislative history, although not in decisions during the Rehnquist/Roberts
Court. 4 The difference should not be surprising given that, as noted earlier,
employees and unions enjoyed somewhat more favorable results overall
during the Burger era than they have experienced since 1986."5 Importantly
for our purposes, the ideological complexion of cases relying on legislative
history in each era does not differ significantly from the complexion of
cases in each era that do not invoke legislative history. 6
2. Legislative History and Ideology in Close Cases
A substantial number of Supreme Court decisions are closely contested
among the Justices and feature one or more reasoned dissents. In Table 2,
we examine whether close cases that include majority reliance on legislative
history have a distinct policy orientation. We do so by reviewing the
ideological outcomes associated with two subsets of majority opinions that
invoke legislative history: majorities in unanimous cases (involving zero
dissenters) and in close cases (involving a vote margin of one or two). The
results reported in Table 2 indicate that a comparable proportion of liberal
and conservative unanimous decisions invoke legislative history. 7 At the
same time, close cases relying on legislative history are more likely to reach
liberal rather than conservative results. 8
53. This distribution favors employees slightly more than the ratios for the 334 decisions that fail
to invoke legislative history, but the difference is not significant. Considering all 578 decisions, 49%
reach liberal results, 44% have conservative outcomes, and 8% are indeterminate. Percentages exceed
100 due to upward rounding for each of these three figures.
54. From 1969 to 1986, the Court's 157 decisions relying on legislative history reached liberal
results in 52% of the cases and conservative outcomes in 41%. The Rehnquist/Roberts Court's eighty-
seven decisions relying on legislative history were split down the middle-47% reached a pro-employee
result and 47% a pro-employer outcome.
55. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
56. In the Burger Court, the 144 decisions not relying on legislative history reached pro-employee
results 49% of the time and pro-employer results 40% of the time. In the period since 1986, the 190
decisions not relying on legislative history reached liberal and conservative results with the same
frequency-47% of the time. These findings virtually mirror the results for decisions relying on
legislative history, reported at supra note 54.
57. The left-hand column of findings reflects that 33.5% of the 158 unanimous liberal decisions
relied on legislative history, while 36.4% of the seventy-seven unanimous conservative decisions
invoked this interpretive resource. For purposes of classifying vote margins, we counted concurring
opinions on the side of the majority. An opinion that both concurred and dissented was counted as a
dissent.
58. For the difference on close cases, t =.0855. In all tables, we identify significant differences
with two asterisks (**) and differences that approach significance with one asterisk (*). See supra note
48. In addition to the results for close and unanimous decisions reported in Table 2, we also coded
results for the 108 decisions involving a wide margin of support (a vote differential of five, six, or
seven) and the ninety-seven cases involving support by a moderate-sized majority (a vote margin of
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Table 2: Ideological Direction of Legislative History (LH)
Reliance in Close and Unanimous Cases (N=373)59
Percentage of Unanimous Percentage of Close
Result Cases Relying on LH Cases* Relying on LH
(N=248) (N=125)
Liberal 33.5% (158) 59.2% (49)
Indeterminate 30.8% (13) 45.5% (11)
Conservative 36.4% (77) 46.2% (65)
*Indicates a difference that approaches significance between liberal decisions and
conservative decisions relying on legislative history for a given vote margin.
It is noteworthy that our 125 close cases have a distinctly conservative
or pro-employer direction overall (52% conservative-65 of 125-versus
39% liberal-49 of 125), a direction that is strikingly evident in
developments since 1986. Close cases during the Burger era were evenly
divided between liberal and conservative outcomes, but the
Rehnquist/Roberts Courts' close decisions have favored employers twice as
often as employees.6" This conservative shift may in turn reflect the
cumulative impact of partisan nominations. Eleven of the thirteen Justices
who joined the Court since 1970 were chosen by Republican presidents,
and almost every one of the eleven was more conservative than the Justice
he or she replaced. 6 It makes sense that a closely divided Court would tend
to tip in a pro-employer direction as the proportion of more conservative
replacements increases.6"
three or four). For both sets of cases, majorities relying on legislative history are somewhat more likely
to reach liberal rather than conservative results. The difference is not significant for the moderate-
margin cases, but approaches significance (t = .071) for the wide-margin decisions. Copies of these
results are available from the authors.
59. Our N of 373 consists of 248 unanimous decisions (thirteen of which are indeterminate) and
125 close cases (eleven of which are indeterminate).
60. Of seventy-one close decisions in the Burger era, thirty-two favored employers, thirty-two
favored employees, and seven were indeterminate. By contrast, of fifty-four close cases since 1986,
thirty-three favored employers, only seventeen favored employees, and four were indeterminate.
61. The individual replacements chosen by Republican presidents were as follows: Blackmun for
Fortas; Rehnquist and Powell for Harlan and Black; Stevens for Douglas; O'Connor for Stewart; Scalia
for Burger; Kennedy for Powell; Souter for Brennan; Thomas for Marshall; Roberts for Rehnquist; and
Alito for O'Connor. Except for Kennedy (who is only slightly more liberal than Powell) and Roberts
(who has served only one term through June 2006), each new Justice scores more conservative on the
Spaeth scale than the Justice being replaced. See supra note 46.
62. Unlike close cases, our 248 unanimous decisions have a decidedly liberal slant both before
and after 1986. In the Burger era, 68% of 108 unanimous decisions reached pro-employee or liberal
results while 26% established pro-employer conservative holdings. During the Rehnquist/Roberts years,
61% of 140 unanimous decisions have been liberal while 35% have reached conservative outcomes.
This prolonged tendency for unanimous cases to produce liberal results may be part of a broader
institutional dialogue involving perceptions of an increasingly conservative Court. Lower courts
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 135 2008
136 BERKELEYJOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT& LABOR LAW Vol. 29:1
Of greater relevance to this study is the fact that when the majority
relies on legislative history in close cases it is more likely to reach a liberal
rather than a conservative outcome. This result too reflects sharp
differences in cases decided since 1986. During the Burger era, majority
opinions relied on legislative history to help justify closely divided
conservative decisions as often as they did to help explain liberal results.
63
By contrast, close cases in the Rehnquist and Roberts years have relied on
legislative history to support pro-employee results at twice the rate of
reliance for pro-employer outcomes.'
The Justices' performance in close cases where legislative history is
used reveals striking differences between the votes of the eight long-serving
liberal Justices and the votes of their conservative counterparts. Liberal
Justices as a group are more likely to rely on legislative history than are
conservatives. We suggest below that this difference has more to do with
interpretive philosophy than ideological orientation.65 When the Court is
closely divided, it is not surprising that Justices who author majority
opinions reaching pro-employee results tend to be liberal and therefore
heavier legislative history users, while Justices who author decisions
favoring employers are likely to be conservative, hence lighter legislative
history users.
In addition, however, the four conservative Justices with extended
tenure on the Rehnquist but not Burger Courts (Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas) have relied on legislative history significantly less
often than did their three conservative colleagues (Justices Stewart, Burger,
and Powell) who served primarily or exclusively on the Burger Court.66
anticipating the Supreme Court's direction, and pro-employer litigants enthused about where the Court
seems to be heading, may tend to expect and argue for more rapid conservative movement in the
workplace law arena than the Court is prepared to undertake. The Justices' response to such pressures is
a unanimous rebuff. The liberal tilt of unanimous decisions also may be due in part to conservative
Justices feeling more constrained by rule-of-law norms than do their liberal counterparts, and therefore
more often voting to uphold legal positions that diverge from their own policy preferences. See Saul
Brenner & Theodore S. Arrington, Unanimous Decision Making on the U.S. Supreme Court: Case
Stimuli and Judicial Attitudes, 9 POL. BEHAV. 75, 78-80 (1987) (speculating on conservative Justices'
penchant for rule-of-law norms during Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts). Finally, unanimous
decisions may reflect more opportunistic judgments by conservative Justices: if the cases raise issues
that are less important in policy terms or are less intensely ideological, liberal victories can be ceded at a
relatively small cost.
63. For close cases reaching pro-employer results in the Burger years, legislative history reliance
was 66% (21 of 32 decisions); for close pro-employee cases, legislative history reliance was 62.5% (20
of 32 decisions).
64. During the Rehnquist/Roberts era, legislative history reliance in close liberal cases has been 53
% (9 of 17 decisions) but for close conservative cases it has been a mere 27% (9 of 33 decisions). This
difference is significant (t =.038).
65. See Part IIIA.5 infra.
66. The four new conservatives identified in text have relied on legislative history in 22 of 113
(19.5%) majority opinions. The three old conservatives relied on legislative history in thirty-five of
sixty-eight (51.5%) majority opinions. The difference is significant (t = .0001). Justice Powell served
briefly on the Rehnquist Court and Justice O'Connor for a short period on the Burger Court, but each
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This difference between new and old conservatives has meant that close
cases favoring employers after 1986 have been less likely to invoke
legislative history as part of majority reasoning than was true before 1986.
The distinction between new and old conservatives has sharpened the
differences in legislative history reliance that exist between liberal and
conservative Justices more generally.
Before turning to relationships between legislative history and
ideology for individual Justices, we note that during the Rehnquist/Roberts
era, majority authors of unanimous decisions rely on legislative history
substantially less often than they do for close cases. 67  This lower level of
legislative history reliance in unanimous opinions raises the possibility that
liberal Justices may be choosing to invoke legislative history less often
when Justice Scalia is on their side (in unanimous cases where they write
the opinion) than when he opposes their position (in close cases where they
author what is usually a pro-employee majority opinion). We pursue this
and other implications of a potential Scalia Effect in Part III.61
B. Legislative History and Ideology for the Liberal Justices
Thus far, we have found that legislative history reliance by the Court as
a whole is not distinctly ideological. Legislative history is as likely to be
invoked to help support pro-employee results as pro-employer outcomes,
and this Court-wide neutrality applies for both the Burger Court and the
Rehnquist and Roberts years. There are, however, certain changes in the
ideological tenor of legislative history usage between the two eras. Close
cases decided since 1986 that rely on legislative history are significantly
authored about 90% of their majority opinions in workplace law during the period to which we have
assigned them. Justice Rehnquist, who served for more than a decade on each Court and authored a
substantial number of majorities in each period, is not included in this comparison.
67. The 140 unanimous majority opinions issued in the Rehnquist/Roberts era rely on legislative
history 26% of the time. By contrast, the fifty-four majority opinions in close cases during these years
rely on legislative history 35% of the time. This difference between legislative history usage in
unanimous and close cases is not significant, although it is not far off (t = .115). Overall, 31% of the
277 Rehnquist/Roberts Court majorities rely on legislative history.
For the dataset as a whole, legislative history is significantly more likely to be used in close cases than in
unanimous decisions (t = .001), and this difference in usage also is significant during the Burger years (t
= .008). The fact that legislative history was used so heavily in Burger era close cases, and that these
close cases were evenly divided between liberal and conservative outcomes (see supra note 63),
suggests a consensus view that evidence of congressional intent was especially valuable in closely
contested settings. No such consensus has existed since Justice Scalia joined the Court. See Part IIIB
infra.
68. While 33% of forty-nine pro-employer unanimous decisions authored since 1986 rely on
legislative history, only 22% of eighty-five pro-employee unanimous decisions during this period invoke
legislative history to help support the holding. However, the 22% figure is attributable to the approaches
taken by the five conservative Justices in this period. The liberal Justices rely on legislative history in
31% of their unanimous pro-employee opinions (seventeen of fifty-four); by contrast, Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas invoke legislative history in a mere 7% of their
pro-employee unanimous majorities (two of twenty-eight). See infra Part lIl.B for further discussion.
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more likely to reach liberal results, although this was not true with respect
to close cases during the Burger years. Further, legislative history during
the Rehnquist and Roberts years is invoked substantially less often in
unanimous decisions than in close cases.
We now shift our attention to patterns of legislative history usage by
the Court's liberal Justices. Our central hypothesis was that the eight
liberals would likely rely disproportionately on legislative history to support
a pro-employee agenda. If this hypothesis is correct, we should expect to
"unmask" the Court's overall ideologically neutral approach by focusing on
the liberal cohort of Justices. As indicated below, however, the evidence
does not support our core assumption.
1. Ideology and Reliance for Liberal Justices as a Group
We consider whether the use of legislative history is ideologically
linked in the hands of our eight liberal Justices by assessing reliance over
the entire thirty-seven year period and also over the separate Burger and
Rehnquist /Roberts eras. We begin by focusing on the 162 majority
opinions authored by these Justices that relied on legislative history, to
determine the extent to which-when using this resource-liberal Justices
are explaining or justifying liberal, pro-employee outcomes.
Table 3: Outcomes Associated with Legislative
History (LH) Reliance by Liberal Justices
All Cases Burger Court RehnquistlRobertsCourt
Liberal Conserv. Liberal Conserv. Liberal Conserv.
Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions
Percentage
of Decisions 48.7% 54.2% 55.6% 62.9% 41.1% 42.2%
Relying on (189) (107) (99) (62) (90) (45)
LH g
(Total number of majority opinions for each outcome in parentheses.)
Table 3 indicates that liberal Justices as a group are outcome neutral
when they rely on legislative history. If anything, their pattern of reliance
in majority opinions is slightly at odds with our assumption that they will
use legislative history to favor a pro-employee approach.
As one would expect, our eight liberal Justices author majority
opinions that uphold employee legal arguments substantially more often
than they vindicate employer positions. Out of 322 authored majorities, the
liberal Justices have supported pro-employee results in 59% of the cases
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(189 decisions) and pro-employer outcomes in 33% (107 decisions).69 This
heavy preponderance exists for majorities authored both before and after
1986.' o
More surprising is that for liberal Justices, legislative history usage
points away from the pro-employee purposes of the workplace law statutes.
Liberal Justices use legislative history to help support pro-employer
outcomes somewhat more often (in 54.2% of their conservative majority
opinions) than pro-employee results (in 48.7% of their liberal majority
opinions). This slight moderating tendency exists in both the Burger and
the Rehnquist/Roberts eras. The differences reported in Table 3 are not
significant, but the fact that liberal Justices' reliance on the legislative
history of liberal workplace statutes even tilts in such a pro-employer
direction warrants further examination.
The pro-employer shading reported in Table 3 becomes somewhat
more pronounced when we compare outcomes for the liberal Justices in the
162 decisions they authored that rely on legislative history versus the 160
decisions that do not.
Table 4: Comparing Liberal Justices' Majorities that Rely and Do
Not Rely on Legislative History (LH)
All Cases Burger Court Rehnquist/Roberts
Court
Liberal Conserv. Liberal Conserv. Liberal Conserv.
Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions
LH
Reliance 57 36 54 38 62 32
(%)
No LH
Reliance 61 31 59 31 62 31(%) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _
As Table 4 indicates, decisions authored by the eight liberal Justices
that rely on legislative history reach pro-employee dispositions 21% more
69. Percentages do not add up to 100 because the 322 majorities authored by liberal Justices
include twenty-six cases with indeterminate ideological outcomes. See supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
70. During the Burger era, liberal Justices' majorities favored employee positions by 56% to 35%
(99 of 178 majorities were pro-employee; 62 of 178 were pro-employer). In the Rehnquist/Roberts
years the ratio is 62% to 31%, (90 of 146 majorities were pro-employee; 45 of 146 were pro-employer.
The eight liberal Justices also rely on legislative history considerably more often than do their
conservative counterparts. Of 322 majority opinions, just over 50% (162) relied on legislative history.
By contrast, the eight conservative Justices have relied on legislative history in only 31% of their
majority opinions (69 of 220). Of the remaining thirty-six decisions not authored by our two cohorts of
Justices, twenty were per curiam opinions and the rest were authored by the five Justices serving for
short periods during this thirty-seven year time frame-Justices Black (three), Harlan (four), Douglas
(eight), Roberts (one), and Alito (zero).
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often than they reach pro-employer results. This liberal-conservative
outcome differential rises by nearly one-third, to 30%, when the decisions
do not invoke legislative history. The tendency for liberal Justices'
majorities to be "less liberal" when they rely on legislative history than
when they do not is especially apparent during the Burger Court years.
The directional trend reported in Tables 3 and 4 is intriguing. We have
posited the existence of a "magnifying effect" in liberal Justices' reliance
on legislative history for liberal workplace statutes-that the eight Justices
will become even more favorable toward employees than expected (based
on their overall ideological voting record) when invoking this politicized
resource. 71  Instead, we have observed in quantitative terms only a
"supporting effect"; the liberal Justices rely on legislative history to reflect
but not extend their pre-existing ideological preferences. Moreover, from a
directional standpoint we have noted a modest "neutralizing effect"; the
Justices' patterns of reliance point toward their being less ideological than
expected when making use of legislative history.72
71. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
72. We also ran a logistic regression analysis to examine whether legislative history reliance was
significantly associated with either pro-employee or pro-employer results when controlling for the
ideologies of the Justices and for certain other factors. Our dependent variable is a liberal or pro-
employee decision. We use the "old" conservatives (Justices Burger, Stewart, and Powell) as our
baseline, so our reference to conservative Justices in this Table covers the five who served for extended
periods of time after 1986. The regression includes 520 of the 534 decisions with an ideological
direction that are addressed in our bivariate analyses. See Table 1 and supra note 42. We omit the
fourteen majorities with an ideological direction authored by short-term Justices Douglas, Black, Harlan,
and Roberts. (The four short-term Justices authored sixteen majorities-see supra note 70-but two of
these had indeterminate ideological results). Table 4A reports our results.
Table 4A: Logistic Regression for Legislative History Use in Majority Opinions (N=520)
Legislative History Majority .54 (.47)
Liberal Justices' Majority .78 (.37)**
Conservative Justices' Majority -.50 (.40)
Burger Court .04 (.21)
Liberals' Reliance on Legislative History -.43 (.53)
Conservatives' Reliance on Legislative History -.93 (.66)
Legislative History Dissent -1.14 (.23)**
Constant -.04 (.36)
**p# .05; Prob > Chi-squared = 000; Pseudo R2 = .09
Robust standard errors appear in parentheses next to coefficients
These results are consistent with our other findings. Liberal Justices are significantly more likely to
reach liberal results when authoring majorities than are the older conservatives, while the newer
conservatives are somewhat less likely to do so than their older conservative counterparts. Legislative
history reliance in a majority opinion-by liberal or newer conservative Justices-is not associated with
either liberal or conservative outcomes. The negative coefficient sign for liberal Justices' reliance on
legislative history indicates there is a slight moderating effect, as reported in Tables 3 and 4, and also
Table 6 below. In addition, reliance on legislative history in dissent is significantly associated with a
conservative result, indicating that the dissenters are using this history to support pro-employee or
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Before attempting to explain at a doctrinal level why the liberal
Justices as a group use legislative history so regularly to support pro-
employer results, we examine the data for these eight Justices as individual
authors of majority decisions. It is possible that for one or two Justices,
legislative history reliance is powerfully associated with results that are less
ideological than normal. Instances of significant neutralizing use could
conceal many other liberal Justices' reliance on legislative history to
promote their liberal policy preferences. In this regard, we also report
findings on the majority opinions authored by our eight conservative
Justices. The inclusion of all Justices with substantial tenure during this
period enables us to place the liberal Justices' approach to legislative
history in clearer perspective.
2. Ideology and Reliance for Individual Justices
In assessing the approaches to legislative history by individual Justices,
we have built on our findings in Table 4. For each Justice, we present the
percentage of majority opinions that rely on legislative history to help
support pro-employee versus pro-employer results, followed by the
percentage of majorities not using legislative history that arrive at these two
outcomes. Our interest is in determining whether the outcome differential
(between liberal and conservative results) when a Justice uses legislative
history is more ideologically oriented than when that Justice refrains from
doing so. For liberal Justices, evidence of more ideological uses would be
that majority decisions using legislative history are more liberal than those
not invoking that resource. For conservative Justices, evidence of
ideologically-oriented reliance would be the opposite: that majority
decisions using legislative history are less liberal than decisions not relying
on it.
Table 5 refers to the difference between outcome differentials as our
coefficient. The coefficient has a negative sign if a Justice's legislative
history usage is associated with more neutral results, and a positive sign if
the Justice's legislative history usage points toward results more consistent
with her ideological orientation. Thus, for instance, Justice Brennan
authored sixty-two majorities in our dataset (thirty-seven using legislative
history and twenty-five not). His majority opinions relying on legislative
history reached results that were 70% liberal and 16% conservative, a 54%
differential. His majority opinions not relying on legislative history arrived
at outcomes that were 76% liberal and 16% conservative, a 60%
differential. For Justice Brennan, therefore, the coefficient is -6: he was
slightly less likely to follow his pro-employee voting preferences when
writing majorities that invoked legislative history than when authoring
liberal outcomes. This finding comports with our discussion of when new conservatives use legislative
history in their majorities. See infra Part 1lI.B.3.
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majorities that did not. Table 5 also includes the total number of majority
decisions by each Justice that rely on legislative history and the number that
do not.
Table 5: Ideological Direction of Legislative History (LH)
Reliance by Individual Justices
No Legislative History
Legislative History Usage Usage
Liberal Conserv. Total Liberal Conserv. TotalDcsosDecisions Coefficient
Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions sin
(%) (%) Using LH (%) (%) Li
Liberals
Brennan 70 16 37 76 16 25 -6
Marshall 66 25 32 74 16 19 -17
Blackmun 57 43 21 57 38 21 -5
Stevens 50 50 22 50 47 34 -3
White 28 59 29 47 33 30 -45**
Souter 50 50 10 85 15 13 -70**
Ginsburg 83 17 6 56 22 9 +32
Breyer 80 20 5 56 44 9 +48
Conservatives
Burger 60 30 10 100 0 3 +70
Stewart 47 41 17 40 50 10 -16
Powell 50 50 8 30 55 20 -25
Rehnquist 33 67 12 22 70 27 -14
O'Connor 27 67 15 44 48 25 +36**
Kennedy 0 100 6 41 59 17 +82**
Scalia 0 100 1 28 64 25 +64
Thomas N/A N/A 0 33 67 24 N/A
**Indicates significant difference between a Justice's ideological outcome differential when
relying on legislative history as opposed to when not doing so.
The table indicates that two of the eight liberals, Justices White and
Souter, are significantly less ideological when relying on legislative history
in their majority opinions than when not doing so. For four other liberal
Justices, patterns of reliance point in the same moderating direction,
although the results there are not significant. Only two of the eight, Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg, are inclined to rely on legislative history to reach
more liberal results than in their other majorities; however, this magnifying
association is not significant.
Given the relatively low number of majority opinions authored by
individual Justices, the significance findings for Justices Souter and White
suggest the strength of their results. Moreover, these two liberal Justices
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are interesting because Justice Souter authors majorities that are somewhat
more liberal than what is reflected in his overall vote score whereas Justice
White's majorities are considerably more conservative than is his overall
voting record.13  More generally, the six liberal Justices with negative
coefficients include three Justices whose majority opinions lean heavily in a
pro-employee direction and three others who have authored decisions more
evenly divided in terms of outcome. "
On the other hand, Table 5 indicates that the two most recently
appointed liberals, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, have a more liberal record
when they rely on legislative history than when they do not. In addition,
two of the new conservatives, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, are
significantly more ideological when they invoke legislative history in their
majority opinions-their results when relying on legislative history are
distinctly more favorable to employers than when not doing so. This
magnifying effect contrasts with the moderating association reported for
two of the older conservatives, Justices Stewart and Powell, and also for
Justice Rehnquist, who authored numerous majorities in each era."
The differences between newer and older members of both the liberal
and conservative cohort of Justices suggest that since 1986, the two groups
may be using legislative history more often in support of their policy
preferences than was true during the Burger era. Table 6 reports changes
over time in the outcome-related reliance on legislative history by liberal
and conservative Justices.
73. Justice Souter has supported employees' legal positions in 64% of nearly 200 cases overall,
while favoring employees in 70% of the twenty-three majorities he has authored. Justice White
supported employees' legal positions in 52 % of more than 450 cases, but his fifty-nine majority
opinions favored employees only 37% of the time. See supra note 46 for overall vote scores in our
dataset. Justice White's unusually high proportion of pro-employer majority opinions reflects that he
was often a swing vote, writing conservative majorities in close cases.
74. Justices Brennan (73%), Marshall (69%), and Souter (70%) have authored majorities that
favor employees roughly 70% of the time. By contrast, majorities written by Justices Blackmun (57%),
Stevens (51%) and White (37%) have a more balanced set of outcomes.
75. Chief Justice Burger, the third older conservative, is more ideological when using legislative
history than when not doing so, but he authored only three majorities in our dataset that eschewed
legislative history, making comparisons less reliable. Similarly, Justice Scalia has a very high positive
coefficient, but he has written only one majority that relies on legislative history in our dataset.
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Table 6: Ideological Direction of Legislative History (LH) Reliance
Over Time by Liberal and Conservative Justices
LH Used No LH
Liberal v. Conservative (%) Coefficient
Whole Period: 1.969-2006
Liberal Justices 57 v. 36 61 v. 31 -9 (322)
Conservative 38 v. 57 34 v. 59 -6 (220)
Justices
Burger Court: 1969-1986
Liberal Justices 54 v. 38 59 v. 31 -12 (177)
Conservative 52 v. 40 36 v. 53 -29 (95)**
Justices
Rehnquist/Roberts Court: 1986-2006
Liberal Justices 62 v. 32 62 v. 31 -1 (145)
Conservative 15 v. 81 34 v. 62 +38 (125)**
Justices
**Indicates significant difference in coefficients between Burger and Rehnquist/Roberts
eras. (Number of majority opinions for each group of Justices in parentheses.)
As Table 6 indicates, conservative Justices have become significantly
more ideological in their use of legislative history during the
Rehnquist/Roberts eras. Conservatives' reliance on this resource in the
Burger years was associated with a moderating or pro-employee direction,
but since 1986 their use of legislative history has shifted sharply in favor of
employers.76 Liberal Justices' reliance on legislative history is associated
with a somewhat more ideological orientation when moving from the
Burger Court to the Rehnquist/Roberts years, although the change is not
significant. Moreover, since 1986, liberals as a group have favored liberal
over conservative results to the same extent whether relying on or
eschewing use of legislative history.
76. For the difference between eras, t = .0003. The older conservatives (Justices Burger, Stewart,
and Powell) had a coefficient of -25 during the Burger years, but the two other conservatives who served
during the Burger period (Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor) had a coefficient of -21, also indicating a
moderating association. Justice Rehnquist is the one conservative to have authored a substantial number
of majorities in both eras-26 before 1986 and 13 since that time. His coefficient was -23 in the Burger
era and -15 in the Rehnquist/Roberts years.
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Still, two liberal Justices who authored a considerable number of
majorities in both eras, Justices White and Stevens, used legislative history
more often to support pro-employee results after 1986 than they had done
before that time.77 Decisions authored by Justices White and Stevens, along
with the record of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, suggest that some liberal
Justices may be inclined to invoke legislative history in the
Rehnquist/Roberts years to advance their preferred policy outcomes,
consistent with our initial hypothesis. We consider a strategic explanation
for this approach by the liberal Justices in our discussion below.
IV.
PRINCIPLED AND STRATEGIC USES OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Although our results may warrant further development or analysis in a
number of directions, we focus here on two aspects of our findings. Each
aspect relates directly to the central hypothesis underlying our empirical
inquiry-that liberal Justices may use legislative history on a systemic basis
to advance their ideological agenda.
First, Tables 3, 4, and 5 indicate that for six of the eight liberal
Justices, legislative history reliance is associated with a moderating set of
ideological results. The association is significant for two of the liberals
(Justices White and Souter), and directional for four others (Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) and for the liberal Justices as a
group. These results are important because they call into question our
assumption about legislative history as an ideologically-charged resource.
In Part IIIA, we contend that there are principled, doctrinal reasons why
liberal Justices so regularly rely on the legislative history accompanying
liberal pro-employee statutes to support conservative, pro-employer
outcomes.
Second, Tables 5 and 6 suggest that legislative history usage has taken
on a more politicized complexion in the years since 1986, for Justices in
both the liberal and conservative camps. We examine the possibility that
this shift reflects the development of a Scalia Effect, based on Justice
Scalia's high-profile stance opposing legislative history reliance. By
initially and persistently expressing his unqualified hostility to the use of
legislative history, Justice Scalia has put his colleagues on notice that they
should invoke this resource at their peril. Other Justices must therefore
weigh whether to rely on legislative history with the knowledge that if they
do so, they risk losing his support for their reasoning. In Part 111B, we
77. Justice White authored forty-two majorities in the Burger years and seventeen during the
Rehnquist period. His coefficient changed from -89 to +62 between the two eras. Justice Stevens wrote
twenty-five majorities for the Burger Court and has authored thirty-one majority opinions since 1986.
His coefficient changed less dramatically, from -8 to +1, but it too shifted toward more frequent reliance
on legislative history to favor employees.
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explore how this strategic aspect of judicial reasoning has contributed to an
altered ideological pattern of legislative history usage for liberal Justices
and perhaps for conservatives as well.
A. Liberal Justices and Principled Reliance on Legislative History
We observed early on that legislative history accompanying employee
protection laws is likely to include a considerable array of statements that
explain, justify, or elaborate upon a fundamentally pro-employee set of
legislative preferences.78 At the same time, the fact that these workplace
statutes favor the legal interests of employees does not mean the enacted
provisions or their accompanying legislative records are monolithic. Major
federal workplace legislation is invariably a product of negotiation and
deal-making among multiple participants over an extended period of time.
The chief sponsors and bill managers for comprehensive regulatory
schemes such as the NLRA, ERISA, and antidiscrimination laws79 cannot
hope to navigate the politically sensitive internal procedures in each
chamber without brokering or acceding to some tradeoffs among competing
interests.
Congressional negotiation is reflected in the work product of
authorizing committees and in the floor debates in both houses. Members
understand they are voting on a bill that accords new rights and protections
for employees as its major premise. They also recognize, however, that
those rights and protections are reconciled with the interests of private
employers in maintaining a certain level of efficient and profitable
operation, and with the interests of public employers in avoiding undue
burdens on the fulfillment of government's obligations to its citizens and
taxpayers.
Congress regularly seeks to accommodate such major and minor
legislative objectives in furtherance of its policy-making agenda. With
respect to employee protection statutes, the accommodation takes two basic
forms. One is the insertion in text of an employer defense or exemption
that immunizes business or government from liability in certain settings.8"
The other is compromise on a particular issue or provision that reflects give
78. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3, 20-21.
79. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 el seq. (2000); Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2000); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e etseq. (2000).
80. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (protecting bona
fide seniority systems); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (protecting bona
fide occupational qualifications based on age, and exempting decisions based on reasonable factors other
than age); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), (11) (exempting supervisors and
independent contractors from the Act's coverage).
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and take between supporters of employee and employer interests during the
legislative process.8"
These two forms of textual adjustment are frequently accompanied by
explanatory statements from the committees or the individual members
responsible for negotiating them. Thus, there is legislative history that
justifies or elaborates on the meaning of employer defenses or exemptions
included in the text. There also is legislative history that chronicles or
explains the existence of a compromise between bill supporters and critics
on the issue in question. In addition, the legislative record that attends
enactment of an employee protection bill may suggest in a third, more
oblique, way that a particular issue was resolved in favor of employer
interests. We refer here to legislative history indicating that the right,
protection, or remedy asserted on behalf of employees was not embraced or
perhaps even referenced in committee reports and key floor statements
promoting the language in question, and therefore that employees and their
supporters may have overreached in their claims.
All three of these doctrinal categories may be thought of as pro-
employer legislative history within a pro-employee statute, and all three are
invoked with some regularity by liberal Justices to help explain or justify
pro-employer results. Indeed, of nearly sixty pro-employer majorities
relying on legislative history authored by the liberal Justices, some three-
fifths fall into one or more of the categories identified above. To illustrate
these patterns of reliance, we briefly discuss several Court decisions from
each category.
1. Employer Defenses or Immunities
One important example of an employer defense is section 703(h) in
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,8" which protects employers when
they apply different terms or conditions of employment pursuant to a bona
fide seniority system. In American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,83 Justice
White, writing for the majority, concluded that Congress intended to
exempt post-Act as well as pre-Act seniority systems,8 4 even though
protecting post-Act systems would likely extend the effects of pre-Act
discrimination against racial minorities. Justice White noted that section
81. See, e.g., 1991 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)-(b) (providing compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional discrimination but imposing limitations as to dollar amounts); Doe v.
Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 620-22 (2004) (describing the compromise on § 2(g)(4) of the Privacy Act (5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)( 4 )) that guarantees a $1000 damages award only to plaintiffs who suffered some actual
damages); Mass. Mutual Life v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 139-46 (1985) (describing the compromise on §
409 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1109) that allows a benefit plan but not a plan fiduciary to be held liable for
the improper processing of benefits claims). See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN
THE SUPREME COURT 110 (1964).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
83. 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
84. Id. at 77.
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703(h) did not distinguish on its face between pre- and post-Act seniority
systems.85 He then reviewed in depth the drafting history of section 703(h),
relying on several Senate floor exchanges among key participants to
confirm that Congress meant for all bona fide seniority rights to be
unaffected by the bill, even if this left black employees worse off than their
more senior white counterparts.86
A decade earlier, Justice Brennan relied on legislative history to help
support the applicability of an employer defense under the NLRA. In
Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina,7 the Court held that NLRA
provisions added in 1947 excluding supervisors from the Act's protections
(thereby allowing employers to discharge supervisors on account of their
membership in a union) also freed employers from liability under state laws
that prohibited termination based on union membership.88 Although the
NLRA text was not entirely clear, Justice Brennan for the majority relied
primarily on House and Senate committee reports to conclude that
Congress's dominant purpose in adding the new language was to avoid
problems of divided loyalty by insulating employers from all efforts by
state or federal agencies to make them treat their supervisors as
employees.8 9
More recently, in Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg,9 ° Justice Souter
invoked legislative history to help explain why an employer could use
noncompliance with federal safety regulations to justify its determination
that a visually impaired truck driver was not a "qualified" individual with a
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The decision also
involved other interpretive issues under the ADA,9' but on the question of
the employee's being "qualified," Justice Souter relied on Senate and House
committee reports to establish Congress's understanding that federal safety
rules would limit application of the ADA to individuals able to meet the
relevant physical qualification standards. 92
These three cases are representative of many others in which liberal
Justices invoke legislative history to help sustain the applicability of an
employer exemption or defense. The history is used in some majority
85. Id. at 69.
86. Id. at 72-75. See also Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 580-82 (1984)
(White, J.) (relying on the legislative history of section 706(g) of Title VII in limiting lower courts'
authority to award make-whole relief that is inconsistent with the terms of a bona fide seniority system).
87. 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
88. Id. at 662.
89. Id. at 659-62.
90. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
91. See id. at 562-67 (holding the lower court erred in determining that the employee's monocular
vision impairment made him per se disabled under ADA standards).
92. Id. at 570-74.
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opinions to clarify the meaning of ambiguous text 93 and in other instances
to confirm that the text means what it seems to say.9 4 The Justices interpret
the meaning of employer defenses or exemptions under ERISA9" and some
minor workplace-related statutes96 as well as the NLRA97 and federal
antidiscrimination laws.98
2. Compromises Involving Competing Approaches
The liberal Justices have repeatedly invoked legislative history to
support pro-employer outcomes by demonstrating how this history reveals
or confirms the existence of a negotiated arrangement among interested
groups or legislators on a particular issue. In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
99
Justice Stevens for the majority addressed the time requirements for filing
Title VII charges. The Court reviewed at length the drafting history from
both the 1964 Act and its 1972 amendments, concluding that a charge must
be filed at the EEOC within 300 days even in states where the charge is
initially brought to a state agency for consideration.' 0 In noting the
development of a compromise that set 300 days as a firm limit, Justice
Stevens referred to members' competing interests of preserving remedial
options for victims of discrimination, respecting the role of state agencies in
resolving charges, and minimizing the burdens of having to defend stale or
dormant claims.' 0 '
Fourteen years later, the Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products12
relied on legislative history to establish that two pivotal groups of bill
supporters had in effect agreed to disagree on whether certain controversial
1991 amendments to Title VII should be applied retroactively. Justice
Stevens for the majority conducted a careful review of earlier bill versions
and Senate floor debates, and concluded there was a broad understanding
that no deal could be reached on the contentious issue of retroactivity but
that neither side wanted this lack of agreement to derail the bill's
passage. 0 3 The majority opinion went on to hold in favor of the traditional
93. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Enter. Ass'n of Steam & Gen. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 517-18, 526
(1977) (White, J.); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 98-105 (1979) (White, J.).
94. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Local 103, 434 U.S. 335, 347-49 (1978) (White, J.); Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515-21 (1981) (Marshall, J.); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463
U.S. 85, 98-100 (1983) (Blackmun, J.).
95. SeeShaw, 463 U.S. at98-100;Alessi, 451 U.S. at515-21
96. See Vance, 440 U.S. at 98-105.
97. See Local 103, 434 U.S. at 348-49; Enter. Ass'n., 429 U.S. at 517-18, 526.
98. See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 580-82 (1984) (White, J.).
99. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
100. Id. at 818-24.
101. Id. at 820-23.
102. 511 U.S. 244, 244-45 (1994).
103. Id. at 250-63.
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presumption against retroactivity, noting the absence of a congressional
intent to overcome that presumption. 104
In addition to finding legislative record evidence of Title VII bargains
that favored employer legal positions, the liberal Justices have relied on
such evidence with respect to a series of more minor workplace law
statutes. In Jackson Transit Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union,1"5
Justice Blackmun for the majority addressed the meaning of section 13(c) in
the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,116 which required states and
localities to preserve collective bargaining rights when using federal funds
to help purchase a privately owned transit company. The issue was whether
section 13(c) permitted the union to sue in federal court for alleged
violations; the majority concluded that while the text was ambiguous, the
legislative history definitively resolved the matter against such a federal
right of action." 7 Justice Blackmun reviewed committee reports and floor
debates at length, determining that section 13(c) was meant to promote a
balanced regulatory scheme, accommodating state law to collective
bargaining rights but not supplanting state labor law processes with a
federal law of collective bargaining.' 08
More recently, Justice Souter in Doe v. Chao .9 relied on legislative
history accompanying the Privacy Act of 197411° to confirm that the
statute's award of $1000 in presumed damages to individuals adversely
affected by a federal agency violation did not apply unless a victim suffered
some actual damages. The majority pointed to an uncodified section of the
Act that seemed to defer the question of presumed damages by assigning
the matter to a newly established Privacy Protection Study Commission."'
But Justice Souter also invoked the Act's drafting history to underscore the
Court's holding; he emphasized that the Senate bill's provision authorizing
presumed damages had been deleted in the final version. 112
Once again, these cases are illustrative of many more in which liberal
Justices find persuasive evidence of a congressional deal in the legislative
record, evidence that helps resolve a controversy in favor of the employer's
legal position. The decisions arise under comprehensive workplace
104. Id. at 256, 280, 286. See also Rivers v. Roadway Express Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304-09 (1994)
(Stevens, J.,) (concluding that the traditional presumption against retroactivity was not disturbed where
the legislativc history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act revealed an agreement to disagree over whether to
give retroactive effect to the override of a particular Supreme Court decision).
105. 457 U.S. 15 (1982).
106. Pub. L. No. 88-365, § 10(c), 78 Stat. 307 (1964), as amended by Pub L. No 89-562, § 2(b)(1),
80 Stat. 716 (1966).
107. Id. at 23-24.
108. Id. at 24-29.
109. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
110. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
Ill. Id. at 622.
112. Id. at 622-23.
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regulation schemes besides Title VII, such as ERISA," 3 OSHA," 4 and the
NLRA." 5 Apart from the laws addressed in Jackson Transit and Doe v.
Chao, legislative history identifying compromises has been used to support
the employer's legal position in several other similarly narrow statutes."16
3. Overreaching by Employees
Finally, liberal Justices have frequently relied on legislative history to
show that Congress simply did not go as far as employees and their
advocates contend it did. Such uses of the legislative record differ from
invoking committee commentary or drafting history to disclose or confirm
the existence of a negotiated compromise; Justices reference legislative
history here in a way more akin to the maxim of the dog that didn't bark."'
The Court in this third group of decisions relies on legislative history to
demonstrate or reinforce the implausibility of Congress having extended a
right, remedy, or procedure as sought by employees, because Congress
never endorsed or in some instances even contemplated such an extension
when considering the matter in its deliberative process.
In Allied Chemical Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,"'
Justice Brennan for the majority addressed whether the NLRA required an
employer to bargain with its union over benefits levels for retirees.
Rejecting the agency's interpretation that retirees' benefits were a
mandatory subject of bargaining, the Court held that mandatory bargaining
covered only the terms and conditions of employment for current
employees. "9 Justice Brennan relied heavily on committee reports to show
how Congress intended that the term "employee" not be stretched beyond
its ordinary meaning-individuals working for another for wages or
113. See Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1985) (Stevens, J.).
114. See Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646-49 (1980)
(Stevens, J.).
115. See N.L.R.B. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 124-26 (1987)
(Brennan, J.). See also Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 at 580-82 (White, J.) (discussing assurances
on limits of the Court's remedial powers that Title VII sponsors and managers continually gave bill's
critics and undecided members during floor debates).
116. See Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1989)
(White, J.) (construing text of the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act); United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610
v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1983) (White, J.) (construing language of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)); U.S.
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1973) (White, J.)
(construing language of the Hatch Act).
117. See A. CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 383, 400 (1938).
See generally City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 132 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (applying the "dog that didn't bark" maxim); Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543
U.S. 50, 63 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.) (same); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 239-41
(2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (same).
118. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
119. Id. at 165-66.
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salaries, not those who, due to retirement or any other reason, have ceased
to do so. 120
A decade later, the Court in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co. 121
invoked legislative history when holding that Title VII did not repeal other
provisions of federal law and thus did not deny res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect to a state court judgment affirming that an employment
discrimination claim was unproved. Justice White for the majority
reviewed at length the committee report commentary and floor debate
accompanying the 1964 Act and 1972 amendments. 22 He concluded that
while members expressed concerns that the adequacy of state employment
discrimination remedies might be too readily assumed, they never
envisioned an absolute right to relitigate issues resolved by state courts. 123
In Mead Corp. v. Tilley,124 the Court confronted the question of
whether an ERISA section providing for the orderly distribution of defined
benefit plan assets upon termination also created a right for plan
participants to recover anticipated benefits not otherwise protected. Justice
Marshall for the majority focused on the conference committee
deliberations, because the allocation provision at issue had been cobbled
together in conference by combining features of the House and Senate
bills. 125  He concluded that nothing in the conference report and its
statement of managers suggested or implied that the committee intended to
make this section a source of benefit entitlements rather than simply a
scheme for the distribution of plan assets. 126
More recently, in United States v. Burke, 127 the Court had to decide
whether backpay awards under Title VII were excludable from gross
income under the Internal Revenue Code. Justice Blackmun for the
majority first determined that the relevant revenue code provision excluded
only income for tort-like damages received on account of personal
injuries;128 he then concluded that Title VII's pre-1991 focus on restorative
back pay awards did not qualify within the meaning of the tax code
exclusion. 129  In reaching this conclusion, Justice Blackmun invoked
legislative history from the 1972 amendments characterizing the remedial
scheme as no more than restorative, and also relied on committee reports
120. Id. at 166-68.
121. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
122. Id. at 470-76.
123. Id. at 473-76. See also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 86-88 (1982) (White, J.)
(relying on legislative history to support holding that 1980 ERISA amendments do not repeal by
implication earlier-enacted defenses claimed by the employer).
124. 490 U.S. 714 (1989).
125. Id. at 723-24.
126. Id.
127. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
128. Id. at 233-37.
129. Id. at 241.
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 152 2008
2008 LIBERAL JUSTICES' RELIANCE ON LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 153
accompanying the 1991 amendments, which described the newly added
monetary damages remedies as taking the statute beyond its old equitable
relief limitations. 130
As was true for our two prior categories, there are many more
decisions in which liberal Justices rely on legislative history to help explain
why the right or remedy sought by employees would exceed what Congress
meant to provide for in its legislative approach. Although the examples
presented in text arose under three major workplace protection statutes-
NLRA, ERISA, and Title VII"31-there are numerous instances in which
liberal Justices have relied on the legislative history of more minor statutes
to help rebut such overly ambitious claims by employees and their
advocates.132 In this regard, legislative record evidence is most often used
to confirm or reinforce the Court's conclusion that the text does not cover
what employees' counsel wants it to, but occasionally the majority has
invoked legislative history to help establish such limits in the face of
ambiguous text.133
4. Alternate Explanations Considered
The doctrinal categories we have identified are present in most
decisions where liberal Justices invoke the legislative record to support
results favorable to employers. There are a number of pro-employer
decisions in which the use of legislative history does not fall into any of
these categories. 34 Nonetheless, our three doctrinal approaches offer a
principled, law-based explanation for why legislative history accompanying
liberal statutes is regularly relied on by liberal Justices to help justify
conservative outcomes.
130. Id. at 239, 241.
131. See also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 570-72 (1982) (Stevens, J.)
(construing legislative history of the NLRA); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 86-88 (1982)
(White, J.) (construing legislative history of ERISA); Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v.
Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 546-49 (1988) (Stevens, J.) (construing legislative
history of ERISA); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,229-30 (2000) (Souter, J.) (construing legislative
history of ERISA); Espinoza v. Farab Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-90 (1974) (Marshall, J.) (construing
legislative history of Title VII).
132. See, e.g., Universities Research Ass'n Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 773-77 (1981) (Blackmun,
J.) (construing legislative history of the Davis-Bacon Act); BATF v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 464
U.S. 89, 99-105 (1983) (Brennan, J.) (construing legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978); Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 420-24 (1985) (White, J.) (construing legislative
history of the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); Webb v. Bd. of Educ. of Dyer
County., Tenn., 471 U.S. 234, 241 & n.16 (1985) (Stevens, J.) (construing legislative history of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976); Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691,
695, n.l (2003) (Souter, J.) (construing legislative history of a FLSA provision creating a right to
"maintain" civil action).
133. See, e.g., Herb's Welding Inc., 470 U.S. at 421-23; BATF, 464 U.S. at 103-04.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 214-15 (2001)
(Ginsburg, J.); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 697-99, 705 (1991) (Blackmun, J.); Fed.
Mar. Comm'n v. Pacific Mar. Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40, 54 (1978) (White, J.).
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It is possible that non-doctrinal factors may also be contributing to our
findings. One potential factor involves the power of assigning majority
opinions. Liberal Justices may follow divergent ideological patterns of
legislative history reliance depending on whether they are assigned to draft
a majority opinion by the usually conservative-voting Chief Justice
(Justices Burger or Rehnquist during this period) or by the most senior
associate Justice, who would be a fellow liberal during these years.135 The
assumption here would be that if the Chief Justice has voted with them (and
hence presumably assigns them the opinion), the liberal Justices' reliance
on legislative history should be linked to pro-employer results substantially
more often than pro-employee outcomes. Conversely, if the Chief has not
voted with them (and hence they are presumably self-assigning), the liberal
Justices' use of legislative history should much more likely be associated
with pro-employee rather than pro-employer results.
Were ideological patterns of legislative history usage to vary based on
whether the Chief Justice exercised the power of assignment, this variation
might well conceal the genuine strength of policy preferences in explaining
the liberals' regular use of legislative history to support conservative
outcomes. In fact, however, we found no such variation. Liberal Justices
do rely on legislative history more heavily in self-assigned majorities when
compared with majorities assigned by the Chief Justice.136 But liberals use
legislative history to help support pro-employer outcomes slightly more
often than they do to help explain pro-employee results whether the
majorities are assigned by the Chief or by fellow liberal Justices.37
Further, because the Chief Justice is on their side in four-fifths of the
majority opinions authored by the liberal Justices, it is especially
noteworthy that legislative history is used in these majorities to support pro-
employer results and pro-employee outcomes at similarly substantial
levels. "38 Given these findings, there is no reason to believe that our
doctrinal account of liberal Justices invoking legislative history to help
135. From 1969 to 2006, the senior associate Justice assigning majority opinions when the Chief
was on the other side would almost invariably have been Justice Brennan (1969 to 1990); Justices
White, Marshall, or Blackmun (1990 to 1994); or Justice Stevens (1994 to 2006).
136. When the Chief Justice joins them in the majority, liberal Justices rely on legislative history
47% of the time (121 of 257 decisions). When the Chief Justice is not in the majority, liberal Justices
rely on legislative history 63% of the time (forty-one of sixty-five decisions).
137. Liberal Justices use legislative history in 53% of the 103 pro-employer majority opinions
joined by the Chief Justice and in 43% of the 133 pro-employee majorities that the Chief Justice joins.
When the Chief Justice is not in their majority, liberals rely on legislative history in 75% of their four
pro-employer majorities and in 63% of their fifty-six pro-employee majorities. Details of these and all
other calculations are on file with the authors.
138. See supra note 137. The difference between legislative history usage in pro-employer and
pro-employee decisions when the Chief Justice assigns is not close to significant (t = .38). The Chief
Justice's assignment control for 80% of all majority opinions in our dataset (257 of 322) is consistent
with findings reported in other Supreme Court studies. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 22, at 128
and sources cited therein.
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justify conservative results is shaped or even substantially influenced by
control over the assignment power.
Apart from the institutional factor of who assigns majority opinions,
liberal Justices may act from more directly instrumental motives. One
possibility is that the liberals adapt their reasoning approach based on their
appreciation for how legislative history from pro-employee workplace
protection statutes can help them to support preferred policy outcomes in
important cases. The contention is that liberal Justices may seek to enhance
their "major" policy preference by promoting as a "minor" methods
preference that legislative history reliance is principled and impartial-
often leading toward results contrary to their ideological interests. 39 The
methods preference is deemed to be minor because the pro-employer
decisions it helps justify rarely carry substantial policy implications. Judge
Richard Posner has suggested that the Justices sometimes engage in this
sort of strategic behavior at a subconscious level with regard to
constitutional matters, voting against their personal values or preferences in
cases with relatively minor policy consequences so that they may appear
"principled" on their larger approach to an area of constitutional doctrine or
a method of constitutional interpretation. 140
It is difficult to accept the persuasiveness of this contention in the
instant setting for two reasons. First, if the liberal Justices regularly
operated in such an instrumental fashion-even if mostly at a semi-
conscious level-one would expect to find some evidence of strategic
ruminations in the personal notes or memos they compiled during decades
of service on the Court. To our knowledge, scholarly examination of the
Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Blackmun papers has not produced such
evidence. More importantly, there is little reason to believe that the Justices
anticipated-or could have anticipated on a systemic basis-which
workplace law decisions were likely to have substantial policy
consequences and which were not. Liberal Justices have certainly invoked
legislative history to help justify major pro-employee decisions under
leading regulatory schemes such as Title VII 14' and the NLRA. 142  But
139. Cf Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term; Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 51-52 (2004) (discussing how Justices in Supreme Court cases may declare they are
voting against their policy interests to enhance their images as principled decision-makers constrained
by precedents or other legal norms).
140. See id., at 50-51 (suggesting that Justice Scalia's vote to protect flag burning under the First
Amendment had a very limited impact in policy terms but in effect helped promote his textualist
approach to constitutional analysis, an approach that could, if adopted by a majority, make an overruling
of Roe v. Wade more likely.
141. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-08 (1979) (Brennan, J.)
(using legislative history to help justify lawfulness of voluntary affirmative action); Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2417 (2006) (Breyer, J.) (using legislative history to help
support broad coverage under an anti-retaliation provision of the statute).
142. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 408-15 (1981) (Brennan, J.)
(using legislative history to help justify the preclusion of damages actions against individual employees
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liberals also have relied on legislative history to help support pro-employer
results of considerable consequence under those two comprehensive
statutes'43 and various others.'"
A related but more complex account of strategic motivation offered by
political scientists Lee Epstein and Jack Knight suggests that legislative
history is one of several legal factors operating as a constraint on Justices'
policy preferences, one they may feel obligated to follow even when it leads
to outcomes they would not ordinarily prefer.'45 On this theory, the original
intent of statutory drafters, like the principle of stare decisis, is a
presumptively impartial doctrine that encourages liberal Justices to modify
their policy preferences so as to keep faith with various audiences,
especially the public and the legal community, which expect them to reach
decisions based on legitimate rule-of-law norms. '46 Epstein and Knight do
not regard fidelity to these norms as a driving or primary goal of the
Justices, but rather as operating to provide a necessary framework for their
choices and at least occasionally to shape the outcomes they reach. "'
We find Epstein and Knight's account both more appealing and also
more consistent with the doctrinal explanations we have offered. Statutory
cases heard by the Court can often be decided in either direction on
plausible legal grounds, and the Justices have before them many reasoned
arguments derived from a range of interpretive resources other than
legislative record evidence. Assuming that individual values and policy
preferences do influence the weight or priority given to these resources, the
often subconscious nature of such values and preferences makes it difficult
to discover whether invocation of legislative history in a majority opinion
actually helped motivate a result or simply helped explain it.' 48
for a wildcat strike); N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 91 (1995) (Breyer, J.) (using
legislative history to help justify "salting" as a lawful union organizing technique under the Act).
143. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1994) (Title VII); Firefighters
Local Union 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579-82 (1984) (Title VII); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 86, 88-90 (1973) (Title VII); Linden Lumber Div. v. N.L.R.B., 419 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1974)
(NLRA); Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local Union No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 165-71, 185-88 (1971) (NLRA).
144. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 232 (2000) (ERISA); Mass Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140-141, 145-48 (1985) (ERISA); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local
610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-38 (1983) (§ 1985(3)); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 559-60, 563-67, 570-74 (1973) (Hatch Act); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 245-46 (1970) (Norris-LaGuardia Act).
145. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 22, at 40-45.
146. See id. at 40, 45, 157-59, 163-64.
147. See id. at 45, 165-67, 172, 177 (discussing evidence that the doctrine of stare decisis structures
and influences the Court's decisions). For an insightful recent discussion of how judges' legal training
and individual professional experiences may strengthen their interest in adhering to doctrinal or
principled justifications, see LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 88-117 (2006).
148. See generally DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 349-50,
445-47 (1998); John M. Ferren, General Yamashita and Justice Rutledge, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 54, 70-73
(2003).
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At the same time, we can not overlook the volume and proportion of
workplace law decisions in which liberal Justices rely on legislative history
as an aid in justifying their departure from presumed'49 policy preferences.
The extent to which reliance is associated with pro-employer outcomes
invites an explanation that goes beyond viewing legislative history as a
merely instrumental or episodic constraint. In this regard, it is worth noting
that before 1986, conservative Justices also regularly relied on legislative
history to help justify results contrary to their preferred policy outcomes.'5 0
Further, the three doctrinal categories implemented by liberal Justices in
workplace law have been invoked by some of these same liberals to support
"conservative" results when applying other federal statutes.' 5' In short, the
liberal Justices' recurring reliance on legislative history as an impartial
interpretive asset may reflect a commitment that is pervasive and principled
rather than occasional and opportunistic.
5. Interpretive Philosophy
Based on our earlier findings, the liberal Justices are significantly more
likely than their conservative counterparts to rely on legislative history.'52
The liberals' favorable stance toward this history is distinctive in both the
149. Our reference to "presumed" preferences is meant to acknowledge that liberal Justices-
especially those with voting records closer to a 50:50 split (see supra note 46)-will not automatically
favor a pro-employee outcome in a particular case. A liberal Justice's reliance on legislative history in a
decision that reaches a pro-employer result may at times reflect that the Justice's policy preference
accords with the legislative record evidence being invoked, rather than that the legislative record is itself
serving to constrain that preference. Nonetheless, given the voting patterns of these eight liberal
Justices-six of whom favor the legal positions of employees and unions over three-fifths of the time
under both the Spaeth issue codes and our dataset-it is appropriate to assume that the liberals are
regularly using legislative history to help explain majority opinions that are inconsistent with the
authors' preferred policy outcomes.
150. See supra Table 6; supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. Although the conservatives
were relying on legislative history that was consistent with the overall pro-employee thrust of the
statutes, their tendency to reach more liberal opinions when using this resource than when not doing so
supports our broader notion that many Justices view legislative history as a principled interpretive asset,
justifying their constrained policy choices on more than an anecdotal basis.
151. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125-29 (1985) (White, J.) (relying on
evidence of a congressional compromise in holding that a Clean Water Act provision did not prohibit the
EPA from issuing variances for pollutants listed as toxic under the statute); EPA v. California ex. rel.
State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 215 & n.28, 224-26 & n.39 (1976) (White, J.) (relying on
the legislative history of the Clean Water Act to show a lack of a clear congressional statement that
would subject federal facilities to more stringent state permit requirements); Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 61-63 (1987) (Marshall, J.) (relying on the Clean Water Act
legislative history to show that citizen enforcement actions were authorized only to seek injunctive
relief, not for wholly past violations); Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426 U.S. 1, 11-23 (1976) (Marshall, J.)
(relying on legislative history to show the Clean Water Act compromise in which the Atomic Energy
Commission's authority to regulate radioactive effluents from nuclear power plants was not extended to
an EPA Administrator as well).
152. See supra Table 5,: cumulative findings indicate that liberal Justices rely on legislative history
in 162 of 322 majorities, or 50.3%, while conservative Justices rely on legislative history in 69 of 220
majorities, or 31.4%. This difference is highly significant (t = .0000).
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Burger and the Rehnquist/Roberts eras: liberal Justices have relied on
legislative history 20% more often than conservative Justices since 1986,
and the differential was 13% for the Burger Court. 1
53
The liberals' more sympathetic attitude toward legislative history may
well signify a difference in judicial beliefs about how best to respect the
lawmaking supremacy of Congress. Liberal Justices have tended to regard
efforts to discern and apply the intent of key legislative subgroups or
individual players in terms of furthering their own constitutional role as
junior partner in the lawmaking enterprise.' 54 They believe that the record
of such intent can be evaluated in a suitably cautious manner, and therefore
that legislative history constitutes relevant and probative evidence of what
Congress sought to accomplish.'55 This approach distinguishes them from
Justices Scalia and Thomas, who have often maintained that in order to be
properly deferential to Congress's constitutional role as a unified
lawmaking body, courts should avoid or minimize reliance on the
unenacted intentions expressed by various subgroups within that body.'56
Scholars in both law and social science have contended that this
difference in attitudes must be ideologically driven-that a judge's
willingness to draw on legislative background evidence is inevitably
influenced by the ideological thrust of the evidence itself. " Our findings
on the ideologically neutral aspects of legislative history reliance by liberal
153. In the Burger era, liberal Justices used legislative history in 57.6% of their majorities (102 of
177) while conservative Justices relied on this resource in 44.2% of theirs (42 of 95), a significant
difference (t = .0116). See also Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the
Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 302, 306 (1982) (finding,
based on a limited sample, that liberal Justices cite to legislative history substantially more than
conservative Justices). In the Rehnquist/Roberts years, liberal Justices invoked legislative history in
41.4% of their majorities (60 of 145) while conservative Justices relied on legislative history in 21.6% of
theirs (27 of 125), again a significant differential (t = .0001). Although the persistent refusal by Justices
Scalia and Thomas to invoke legislative history in majority opinions distinguishes them from all other
Justices, three other conservatives (Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, Powell) rank as the next lowest
legislative history users. Of the nine most frequent users, seven are liberals. See generally Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 52, at 222-23.
154. See e.g., Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1996) (Stevens,
J., concurring); W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 845, 853-61 (1992).
155. See generally United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992)
(Souter, J., plurality); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 & n.4 (1991) (White,
J.); Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) (Marshall, J.) (quoting from United States v. Am.
Trucking Assns. 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)).
156. See, e.g., Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67-68 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring)
(rejecting legislative history as superfluous to the interpretive enterprise).
157. See Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U.
COLO. L. REV. 37, 38-51 (1991); Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 399, 420-25 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 562 (1989).
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Justices suggest that interpretive philosophy may be a more important
factor than previously acknowledged.
Most major bills that become laws undergo considerable changes
between introduction and final enactment, due to formal divisions in power
between the executive and legislative branches and also to various
procedural obstacles within Congress itself. Complex or controversial
legislative proposals are usually modified (and occasionally recast) by
principal sponsors or managers in order to accommodate the concerns of
wavering colleagues or to co-opt segments of the opposition. Because
substantial adjustment in text-both before and after a bill's introduction-
is the rule rather than the exception, committee or floor commentaries that
accompany the particular stages of language modification shed light on
whatever qualitative changes have taken place. Put succinctly, legislative
bargains are a well-accepted feature of American lawmaking, and
legislative history may illuminate a bargain's existence or help explain
some of its details.
The three doctrinal categories of legislative history invoked by liberal
Justices to help explain conservative results may be understood as
addressing distinct aspects of this bargaining process. First, legislative
history describing and elaborating on employer exemptions or defenses
amplifies what is often the earliest form of textual adaptation. Drafters and
key initial sponsors incorporate certain protections for employer interests
before bill language is even made public, based on discussions among
supporters as well as potential opponents or undecideds. Second,
legislative record evidence reflecting the existence or contours of
subsequent compromises is likely to be found in the post-introduction
drafting history. This record of explicit bargains reached during a bill's
voyage through Congress indicates when and perhaps why certain
employee rights or protections were traded away or not secured after having
been advocated by a key group of supporters. Finally, legislative history
signifying employee overreach may be viewed as identifying an implicit
bargain among the major players. Even on matters where conscious give
and take did not occur, deliberative dialogue viewed in context may indicate
that Congress never meant to address the issue now raised by employee's
counsel, or to go as far as is being advocated.
Our conclusion-that many Justices invoke legislative history to help
understand different dimensions of the bargaining process-is at odds with
Justice Scalia's critique of such history as deeply unreliable with respect to
what Congress considered or intended when it voted on a bill or provision
of text.'58  Professor John Manning has elaborated on Justice Scalia's
158. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 31-
35 (1997). Justice Scalia further maintains that legislative history is intrinsically illegitimate when it is
invoked as a basis for imputing intent to Congress. See id. at 35. Arguments regarding the
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position, arguing that congressional players bargain "in complex and often
unknowable ways over a statute's wording," '159  and that because
purposivism-which includes reliance on legislative history--cannot
plausibly claim to capture the legislative preferences underlying bargained-
for text, it furnishes no special insights into the realities of legislative
compromise. 160
The liberal Justices in our dataset plainly do not embrace this textualist
vision. An assessment of their key normative assumption, that legislative
history may in appropriate circumstances be imputed to Congress as a
whole,"'6 is beyond the scope of this Article. In descriptive terms, however,
it is worth emphasizing the frequency with which these Justices invoke
legislative record evidence to help set limits on the coverage and
protections available under pro-employee statutory regimes. The liberals'
regular and nuanced reliance on legislative history reflects their belief that
this history can help illuminate the dimensions and details of complex
legislative deals. More important, these Justices' willingness to follow a
legislative history trail leading away from their preferred policy
perspectives indicates the principled nature of their interpretive approach.
B. Liberal Justices and Strategic Behavior-A "Scalia Effect"
In determining that legislative history usage has aligned somewhat
more closely with the Justices' ideological preferences since 1986, we
presented our findings in Part II based on a division between the Burger era
and the Rehnquist/Roberts period. However, when considering shifts in the
Justices' approaches to legislative history as an interpretive asset, a more
salient development than the ascension of Chief Justice Rehnquist is the
arrival of Justice Scalia. While serving as an appellate judge, Scalia had
voiced reservations about the reliability of legislative history,16 and his
constitutional legitimacy of invoking legislative history are not addressed in this article. See supra note
I and sources cited therein.
159. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
33, 38 (2006).
160. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists? 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
99, 102-03 (2006).
161. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 87-88 (2005); Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77
(1996) (Stevens, J. concurring); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8
(1992) (Souter, J., plurality). See also Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central
Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 437-53 (2005) (discussing how
intent is imputed to legislatures and other group actors on philosophical and linguistic grounds); Lord
Hoffnann, The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings, 114 S.A.L.J. 656, 669 (1997) (explaining
that a high profile ministerial explanation of ambiguous text, given on the floor of the House of
Commons and from which no member dissents, will at times be the best evidence of what Parliament
must have understood it was approving).
162. See Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (concurring opinion). See also Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 442-43 (1998)
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criticisms generated a reaction from Senators during his confirmation
hearings. 163  Upon becoming a Justice in the 1986 Term, Justice Scalia
began to express relentless opposition to colleagues' use of legislative
history; he has maintained this outspokenly critical stance to the present
day.
1. Justice Scalia's Line in the Sand
During his first three terms on the Court, Justice Scalia authored a
series of separate opinions-including at least eight concurring in the
Court's judgment-in which he expressly attacked or questioned the
majority's reliance on legislative history. 164 In these separate writings,
Scalia insisted that the Court should not use legislative history to confirm or
reinforce the plain meaning of text, 165 that legislative history is very likely
to be generated for strategic or insincere reasons, 166 and that in any event it
is highly unreliable. 16  He also asserted on several occasions that courts
must discover a statute's purpose or intent only from analyzing the text and
not from the vagaries of a legislative record drafted or understood by, at
best, small subgroups of members. 1
68
Justice Scalia has continued to object strenuously to the use of
legislative history throughout his years on the Court. 169  He often makes a
point of declining to join sections of majority analyses that invoke
(discussing Scalia speech critical of legislative history, delivered at a number of law schools during the
1985-86 academic year).
163. See Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Commission on the Judiciary, 99th Congress (1986) at 65-68
(remarks of Senator Grassley), 106-07 (remarks of Senator Mathias).
164. For separate concurrences, see, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987);
Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 642-43 (1987); U.S. v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-45 (1988); Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989);
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1989); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701,
738 (1989); H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252 (1989). See also Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 637-38 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking legislative history reliance); Citicorp
Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 40 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting legislative history
reliance by embracing portions of majority analysis that do not discuss legislative history). For
thoughtful discussion of Justice Scalia's critiques of legislative history usage, see ESKRIDGE ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 987-90; Farber & Frickey, supra note 162, at 438-49.
165. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452-53; Taylor, 487 U.S. at 344-45; United States v. Stuart,
489 U.S. 353, 372-73 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
166. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 99.
167. See Rose, 481 U.S. at 642-43; Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 99; Nw. Bell, 492 U.S. at 252.
168. See Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 527-28; Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 29-30; Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 267 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 535-37 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 287-88 (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 314 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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legislative history, 7 ' and he has written separately to chastise newer
colleagues for relying on this resource.' 7 ' Recently, he opposed according
differential probative weight to various forms of legislative history, re-
stating his belief that neither legislative commentary of any kind nor the
language modifications accompanying a bill's enactment should be
admissible in the interpretive enterprise. 1712
Liberal Justices at times have pushed back against the Scalia critique,
defending the basic utility of legislative history in their majority
decisions'73  or in separate opinions.' 4  Nonetheless, Justice Scalia's
regularly voiced absolutist stance has had an impact over time. Faced with
his outspoken opposition (subsequently supported by Justice Thomas),' 75
some Justices seem to have concluded, even if subconsciously, that
invoking legislative history in certain settings was not worth the risk of
losing support for one's majority opinion or inviting a sharply-worded
concurrence. 1
76
In examining why liberal Justices' use of legislative history has been
somewhat more congruent with their policy preferences after 1986, we
170. See, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 623 (2004); Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 344 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994); Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 138 n.* (1993); Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 507 U.S. 170, 172 n.l (1993).
171. See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 1990-91 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (criticizing Justice Alito's reliance on legislative history); United
States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220-21 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (critcizing
Justice Ginsburg's reliance on legislative history); Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516
U.S. 264, 279-83 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing Justice Ginsburg's reliance on legislative
history); U.S. v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criticizing Justice Souter's reliance on legislative history).
172. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2815-17 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993) (Stevens, J.); Thompson/Center
Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 516 n.8 (Souter, J., plurality); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S.
597, 610 n.4 (1991) (White, J.).
174. Bank One Chi., 516 U.S. at 276-79 (Stevens, J., concurring); W. Va. Hosps. v. Casey, 499
U.S. 83, 112-115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also BREYER, supra note 161, at 85-88, 91-95
(defending the legitimacy and utility of legislative history in a non-judicial writing).
175. Justice Thomas has often endorsed Justice Scalia's refusals to join legislative history sections
of a majority opinion. See, e.g., Thunder Basin, 510 U.S.at 219; Darby, 509 U.S.at 138 n.*; Reves, 507
U.S. at 172 n.I. In addition, Scalia and Thomas have steadfastly refused to invoke legislative history in
their majority opinions. In our dataset of labor and employment statutory decisions, the two Justices
have authored fifty majority opinions, only one of which relied in any way on legislative history.
176. See, e.g., Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History:
The Impact of Justice Scalia 's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 390-95 (1999) (discussing declining
reliance by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 222-24 (discussing
declining reliance by Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall). See also Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret
Decline of Legislative History: Has Someone Heard a Voice Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 PUB. INT.
L. REV. 57, 64-67, 70-73 (1994) (examining the Court's use of legislative history in the 1992-93 Term
and hypothesizing that pressure from Justice Scalia is the most likely explanation for the Court's
declining usage); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351, 365 (1994) (discussing the challenge of building majority coalitions in the face of an
uncompromising stance from Justices Scalia and Thomas).
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considered the possibility that liberals may simply have become more
committed to or adept at employing such history to advance their
ideological values. There is, however, no apparent reason to believe that
liberal Justices would adopt a more ideological position toward this
interpretive resource after Justice Scalia's arrival, especially given our
overall findings regarding their majority opinions since 1986.' Instead,
we hypothesize a Scalia Effect: that strategic considerations related to
retaining Justice Scalia's support may better account for shifts in opinion-
writing approaches by liberal members of the Court.
2. Liberal Justices' Exercise of Legislative History Restraint
Our assumption is that Justices wish to avoid alienating unnecessarily a
colleague who has voted with them in Conference. Given Justice Scalia's
relentless objections to legislative history, some liberals may be reluctant to
invoke that resource when authoring pro-employer majorities they expect
Justice Scalia to join. If these Justices refrain from using legislative history
in a sufficient number of pro-employer majorities, their remaining pattern
of reliance will acquire a more pro-employee complexion. As we now
show, this strategic hypothesis receives considerable support from the pro-
employer majority opinions of several liberal Justices. Our projected Scalia
Effect also is consistent with how often liberal Justices overall have used
legislative history when Justice Scalia joins their majorities as opposed to
when he does not.
We reported in an earlier article that Justices White and Stevens used
legislative history significantly less frequently during the Rehnquist years
than they had in the Burger era. 78 For our purposes, the sharp decline in
reliance after 1986 is especially instructive with respect to their pro-
employer majority opinions. Out of twenty-two conservative majorities
joined by Justice Scalia that were authored by liberal Justices and did not
invoke legislative history, three-fifths were majorities authored by Justices
White or Stevens.1
79
177. See supra Table 3 (reporting that, since 1986, liberals have continued relying on legislative
history to help justify the same proportion of conservative as liberal outcomes); supra Tables 4, 6
(reporting that liberals since 1986 have favored pro-employee over pro-employer results by a two to one
margin in their opinions, whether invoking or ignoring legislative history).
178. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 223. When omitting these Justices' majority
opinions in pure constitutional decisions, and adding decisions from the first Roberts term, Justice White
went from using legislative history in 62% of his majorities (twenty-six of forty-two) during the Burger
Court to 18% (three of seventeen) after 1986, while Justice Stevens' rate of reliance declined from 48%
(twelve of twenty-five) to 32% (ten of thirty-one). Justice White's differential is highly significant (t =
.0008) while the difference for Justice Stevens approaches significance (t = .099).
179. Of the twenty-two pro-employer majorities referred to in text, Justice White authored seven
and Justice Stevens six. The remaining nine were written by Justices Breyer (three), Ginsburg (two),
Souter (two), Blackmun (one), and Marshall (one). A list of all twenty-two majorities is on file with the
authors and may be derived from the tables on Professor Ditslear's website, referred to at supra note 36.
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During the Burger era, sixteen of Justice White's eighteen pro-
employer majorities relied on legislative history. By contrast, after Justice
Scalia's arrival, only one of Justice White's nine pro-employer majorities
invoked legislative history, and Justice Scalia joined seven of White's eight
pro-employer majorities that did not make use of such history. 80 The shift
for Justice Stevens, while not as dramatic, is still revealing. During the
Burger period, Justice Stevens relied on legislative history to help justify
seven of his fifteen conservative majorities; after 1986 he invoked this
resource to help explain four of his twelve conservative majorities. Justice
Scalia joined six of the eight conservative Stevens majorities that did not
use legislative history. 181
Moreover, in two of Justice Stevens' four conservative majorities that
did rely on legislative history, Scalia authored concurrences criticizing the
majority's use of this resource. 8
To be sure, a sharply diminished reliance on legislative history in pro-
employer majorities written after 1986 does not establish that Justices
White and Stevens adjusted their reasoning in an effort to retain Justice
Scalia's vote. One plausible alternative explanation is that the prevailing
litigants before the Court in these cases failed to raise substantial legislative
history arguments, and thus the majority authors had no occasion even to
consider exercising restraint. We explored this possibility by reviewing the
merits briefs filed by the parties, and where applicable the Solicitor
General,' 83 for all twenty-two of the pro-employer majorities joined by
Justice Scalia. What we found tends to reinforce our hypothesis as to the
presence of a Scalia Effect.
In eight of the twenty-two decisions in question, the side that prevailed
before the Court did not seriously rely on legislative history in its merits
briefs.8 4 In the other fourteen decisions, however, the majority declined to
invoke legislative history even though the prevailing party, at times
supported by the Solicitor General, relied explicitly and often substantially
180. In the eighth pro-employer majority, Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825
(1988), Scalia joined the dissent. Id. at 841 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181. In the two pro-employer majorities he did not join, Justice Scalia authored a dissent in De
Buono v. NYSA Med. Services Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997)), and filed a statement concurring in the
judgment in CIR v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 337 (1995)).
182. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 287-88 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 314 (1994). In the other two pro-employer majorities relying
on legislative history, Justice Scalia joined one opinion in Laborers Health Trust v. Advanced
Lightweight Concrete, 484 U.S. 539 (1988) and joined a dissent in the other, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 541 (2001).
183. The Solicitor General participated at the merits stage in fourteen of these twenty-two cases,
either as a party or amicus.
184. In three of these eight decisions, there were no substantive legislative history arguments at all.
In the other five, the losing side relied on legislative history as part of its argument but the winning side
did not. We assumed arguendo that in this setting the Court's decision not to rely on legislative history
was attributable to the history's failure to support the majority's reasoning rather than to the majority's
interest in avoiding reliance.
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on a legislative history argument. Five of these decisions-all five-to-four
majorities-were authored by Justice White.' 85  Four decisions-two
unanimous and two with dissents filed-were written by Justice Stevens. 186
Thus, in five of seven White majorities and four of six Stevens majorities
favoring employers that Justice Scalia joined, the majority authors did not
invoke legislative history, even though the prevailing side argued strongly
for such reliance.
Intriguingly, Justice Breyer authored three of the remaining five pro-
employer majorities that did not invoke legislative history in the face of
substantive reliance on this resource by the prevailing party.'87 The absence
of legislative history use in those three decisions lends a distinctly liberal
tint to Breyer's relatively small set of majorities invoking legislative
history.188
It is worth noting that Justices Stevens, Breyer, and White have been
outspoken advocates for the reliability of legislative history, explicitly
rejecting Justice Scalia's critiques on this score.' 89 Perhaps because their
beliefs on the value of legislative history are well established, they see little
to be gained by vexing Scalia when he has voted with them, at least when
they conclude the majority's result can be adequately justified without
185. See Church of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (petitioner and Solicitor
General relied on legislative history argument); Monesson Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 (1988)
(petitioner relied on legislative history argument); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989) (respondent relied on legislative history argument); Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Assn., 491 U.S. 490 (1989) (petitioner relied on legislative history argument);
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40 (1989) (petitioner relied on legislative history
argument). Briefs referenced for all decisions cited in notes 185-87 were obtained and downloaded
through Westlaw; they are on file with the authors.
186. See Mullins Coal Co. Inc. v Dir., OWCP, 484 U.S. 135 (1987) (petitioner and Solicitor
General as respondent relied on legislative history argument); Golden State Transit Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (petitioner relied on legislative history argument); INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for
Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183 (1991) (Solicitor General as petitioner relied on legislative history
argument); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (respondent relied on
legislative history argument).
187. See Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 414
(1995) (respondent relied on legislative history argument); Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231
(1996) (respondent and Solicitor General for petitioner relied on legislative history argument); Metro N.
Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) (petitioner relied on legislative history argument).
The final two decisions in which the prevailing party invoked legislative history are Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (Souter, J.), and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (Marshall, J.).
Justice Breyer authored a fourth pro-employer majority without legislative history, from which Justice
Scalia dissented. See U.S. Airways Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
188. See supra Table 5 and accompanying discussion (reporting Justice Breyer's five majorities
that rely on legislative history are substantially more liberal than his nine majorities that do not). If even
two of the first three majorities cited in note 179 had relied on legislative history, Breyer would then
have authored four of seven pro-employee majorities using legislative history and five of seven pro-
employer majorities invoking such history, making his majority opinions relying on legislative history
more conservative or pro-employer than his majorities not relying on that resource.
189. See, e.g.. Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-79 (1996) (Stevens,
J., concurring); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n. 4 (1991) (White, J.);
BREYER, supra note 161, at 85-88, 91-95.
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having to rely on such history. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to suggest
that Justice Breyer-like Justices White and Stevens-may be forgoing
legislative history reliance in certain cases as a form of "preemptive
accommodation" 90 to retain Justice Scalia's support.
Our findings with respect to these subsets of pro-employer majorities
constitute only a preliminary showing of Justice Scalia's impact on certain
liberal Justices. The twenty-two majorities without legislative history, for
instance, represent one-half of the pro-employer decisions written by liberal
Justices since 1986, but only 15% of all decisions written by liberal Justices
during that period.19' Future research attempting to demonstrate this point
would require, at a minimum, reviewing briefs from hundreds of additional
cases.' 92 There are, however, several further aspects of our dataset that tend
to indicate that Justice Scalia's implacable stance on legislative history has
influenced patterns of reliance by his liberal colleagues.
First, liberal Justices as a group rely on legislative history less than
one-third of the time when Justice Scalia joins their majorities but in nearly
three-fifths of the cases where he agrees with the result yet writes a separate
concurring opinion. 9' Justice Scalia's refusal to endorse the majority
opinion may not be due to the presence of a legislative history argument,
and his joining the majority is unlikely to be a function simply of the
majority's silence on legislative history matters. Still, the gap is large
enough to suggest that most liberal Justices' 94 view legislative history as an
190. See FORREST MALTZMAN ET. AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL
GAME 96-98 (2000). Maltzman and his co-authors discuss both preemptive and responsive
accommodation in the context of substantive differences among the Justices, but preemptive
accommodation may also occur for methodological reasons, especially when one Justice's position is
presented in such relentlessly uncompromising terms.
191. The liberal Justices have authored 145 majorities from the 1986 Term through the 2005 Term;
see supra Table 6. Justice Scalia has participated in all but one of those cases. See Chao v. Mallard Bay
Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235, 236 (2002). Of the 145 decisions, ninety reached pro-employee outcomes,
forty-five reached pro-employer outcomes, and ten were indeterminate. See supra Table 3 (identifying
cases with pro-employee and pro-employer outcomes).
192. It would be helpful to consider prevailing parties' positions on legislative history reliance in
pro-employer decisions not joined by Justice Scalia and in pro-employee decisions that he joined, as
well as making some comparisons with party briefs in the period before 1986. Further, unlike Justices
White and Stevens, Justices Blackmun and Brennan did not reduce their legislative history reliance in
majorities written after Scalia joined the Court. And unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Souter has invoked
legislative history in a number of pro-employer majorities joined by Justice Scalia. The factors
influencing different Justices at various times are complex and case-specific, and we do not wish to
oversimplify what accounts for decisions about judicial reasoning.
193. Liberal Justices rely on legislative history in 31% of the eighty-eight majorities that Scalia
joins, but in 58% of the twenty-four majorities where he concurs separately; that difference is significant
(t = .0002). The liberals also rely on legislative history in 58% of the thirty-three majorities from which
Justice Scalia dissents in whole or in part.
194. Of the eighty-eight majorities that Justice Scalia joined, five liberal Justices authored ten or
more each: Stevens (nineteen), Souter (sixteen), Blackmun (thirteen), White (thirteen), and Ginsburg
(ten). Reliance on legislative history ranged from 37-38% (Blackmun and Souter) to 30% (Ginsburg)
and down to 15-16% (White and Stevens). Of the twenty-four majorities with which Scalia concurred
separately, three liberal Justices authored four or more: Stevens (seven), Blackmun (four), and Marshall
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interpretive asset to be deployed with some caution when Scalia is on their
side. That caution is presumably encouraged by the fact that almost half of
Scalia's fourteen concurrences in this setting criticize the majority's
reliance on legislative history. "I
Second, looking at pro-employee majorities authored by liberal
Justices, legislative history reliance is significantly higher in close cases
than in unanimous decisions. 196 Liberals seem comfortable invoking
legislative record evidence in narrow pro-employee majorities where Justice
Scalia is unlikely to vote with them, 97 but they are more reluctant to make
use of this resource in the unanimous decisions favoring employees that
Scalia does join.'98 Once again, Justice Scalia's presence in the majority
may be subtly discouraging the use of legislative history, even when the
prevailing party's legal arguments urge such reliance.' 99
(four). Reliance on legislative history here ranged from 75% (Blackmun and Marshall) to 57%
(Stevens). Justices Brennan and Breyer each authored a relatively small number of majorities out of the
112 discussed in this footnote-six and nine respectively.
195. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220-21 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (criticizing Ginsburg); Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (criticizing
Stevens); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 287-88 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criticizing Stevens); Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 314 (1994) (criticizing Stevens);
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (criticizing Blackmun); Citicorp. Indus.
Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 40 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (indirectly criticizing Marshall).
From outside our dataset, see also Blanchard v. Bergeson, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (criticizing
White); U.S. v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-45 (1988) (criticizing Blackmun); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (criticizing Stevens); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 642-43 (1987)
(criticizing Marshall).
196. The liberal Justices relied on legislative history in 60% of 15 close decisions reaching pro-
employee results, but in only 31% of 54 unanimous decisions favoring employees, a significant
difference (t = .0011).
197. Of the nine close pro-employee majorities in which liberal Justices relied on legislative
history, Scalia joined two. See Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S.Ct. 2121 (2006)
(Ginsburg, J.); Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988) (Blackmun, J.). He dissented on the seven other
occasions.
198. Greater reluctance does not mean abandonment. As noted earlier, the liberal Justices' 31%
level of reliance on legislative history in these 54 pro-employee unanimous majorities is substantially
higher than their conservative colleagues, who invoke legislative history in a mere 7% of their 28 pro-
employee unanimous decisions. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. This difference may well
reflect the divergence in interpretive philosophy discussed supra at III.A.5.
199. The prevailing party and/or the Solicitor General as supporting amicus relied on legislative
history in twenty of the thirty unanimous pro-employee decisions that did not invoke this resource. The
twenty decisions were authored by seven different liberal Justices.
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Table 7: Justice Scalia's Behavior in Majority Opinions That Rely
and Do Not Rely on Legislative History (LH) (N=266) 20
Scalia Votes for Scalia Joins
Majority Result Majority Opinion(%) (%)
Liberal Majority Relies on LH 68.3 (41) 45.0 (27)
Liberal Majority Does Not Rely on LH 82.1 (69) 71.4 (60)
Conserv. Majority Relies on LH 92.0 (23) 83.3 (20)
Conserv. Majority Does Not Rely on LH 92.8 (90) 81.9 (59)
(Total number of majority opinions for each outcome is in parentheses.)
Finally, the results in Table 7, which present Justice Scalia's overall
judicial behavior on voting with the majority and joining majority opinions,
indicate that liberal Justices have special grounds for concern if they invoke
legislative history. When liberal Justices rely on legislative history, Scalia
is significantly less likely to join their majority opinions even when he
votes on their side.2 ' Moreover, Justice Scalia is also significantly less
likely to vote for the majority result when liberal Justices rely on legislative
history than when they do not.202 Our analyses of the Scalia Effect have
focused primarily on whether Justice Scalia is willing to join certain
majority opinions, but this finding suggests that the presence of legislative
history in a majority opinion written by liberal Justices is also linked to
whether Justice Scalia will support the case's outcome. In addition, when
liberal Justices rely on legislative history in their majorities, Justice Scalia
is significantly less likely to vote for the majority's result or to join the
majority's opinion than is true when his fellow conservative Justices rely on
203legislative history in their majorities.
The findings reported in Table 7 reinforce our conclusions with respect
to the subsets of pro-employer and pro-employee majorities authored by
liberal Justices discussed above.20 4 At the same time, it is noteworthy that
200. The N of 266 includes Justice Scalia's twenty-six majority opinions as part of his voting
conduct, but these decisions are omitted from analysis of his joining behavior. The total N excludes four
of the 270 cases analyzed in supra Table 6: three cases in which Justice Powell (an older conservative)
authored the Court's majority, and one case in which Justice Scalia recused himself.
201. Scalia has voted for the result secured in these decisions 68% of the time, but has joined the
majority opinions authored by liberal Justices only 45% of the time; the difference is highly significant
(t = .017).
202. Scalia voted with majorities authored by liberal Justices 68% of the time when those Justices
relied on legislative history, but 82% of the time when they did not invoke that resource; once again, the
difference is significant (t = .035).
203. Scalia voted for the majority result in 68% of the liberals' sixty majorities that used legislative
history as opposed to 92% of the conservatives' twenty-five majorities that relied on this resource, a
highly significant difference (t = .009). Similarly, he joined majority opinions relying on legislative
history 45% of the time when liberals were authors, but 83% of the time when conservatives wrote the
majorities (t = .003).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 178-99.
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Justice Scalia's resistance to supporting results or joining opinions, justified
in part by legislative history analysis, does not extend to majorities authored
by his conservative colleagues.2"5 Indeed, when it comes to majorities
authored by these conservatives, Justice Scalia is every bit as likely to vote
for a result, or join a majority, that relies on legislative history as one that
does not.20 6 In contrast to his intense monitoring of liberal Justices' use of
legislative history, Justice Scalia seems inclined to give his conservative
colleagues a free ride when they invoke this interpretive resource. We
examine one aspect of Scalia's distinctive behavior toward conservative-
authored majorities in the Subsection that follows.
3. Conservative Justices' Use of Legislative History: A Free Ride?
Although we focus on how liberal Justices' reliance on legislative
history has been affected by Justice Scalia, a brief excursion into usage by
other conservative Justices allows for some instructive comparison. In
following up on the results from Table 7, we reviewed the eighteen pro-
employer majorities authored by Justice Scalia's conservative colleagues
since 1986 that relied on legislative history. These decisions-authored by
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy 2 7 -could give rise to some
tension for Scalia: they reach results he is likely to endorse but use a form
of reasoning he is known to oppose.
We found that Justice Scalia joined seventeen of these eighteen pro-
employer majorities; he refused to endorse his conservative colleagues'
reliance on legislative history only once in eighteen cases.208  That record
contrasts markedly with Justice Scalia's position when liberal Justices rely
on legislative history to help justify pro-employer outcomes. There are
nineteen such decisions written by liberals, of which Scalia joined only ten.
Moreover, on the five occasions when Scalia concurred separately without
joining the Court opinion, he either criticized the liberal Justice's use of
legislative history 9 or else avoided invoking that history altogether.2"'
205. The conservative colleagues who authored majorities invoking legislative history in Table 7
are Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Kennedy; Justice Thomas has not written a single majority
relying on legislative history in our dataset.
206. Thus, Justice Scalia voted for results established in a conservative colleague's majority
decision 92% of the time when the decision relied on legislative history and 93% of the time when it did
not. Similarly, Justice Scalia joined a conservative colleague's majority opinion 83% of the time when
the author relied on legislative history and 82% of the time when legislative history was not invoked.
207. Justice O'Connor authored nine, Justice Kennedy authored six, and Justice Rehnquist authored
four. Justice Thomas has authored no majorities, pro-employer or pro-employee, that rely on legislative
history in our dataset.
208. That one instance is Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738 (1989), where he
concurred in the judgment and criticized Justice O'Connor's use of legislative history. See supra note
164 and accompanying text.
209. See Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 287-88 (1994) (criticizing majority opinion
by Stevens, J.); Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 314 (1994) (criticizing majority opinion by
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One could infer from this disparity that Justice Scalia is simply less
suspicious when conservatives use legislative history than when liberals do,
but the reality may be more complex. Of the eighteen pro-employer
majority opinions authored by conservatives, six are unanimous and twelve
include dissenting opinions. Importantly, eight of the twelve dissents rely
on legislative history, so that both majority and dissenting opinions invoke
legislative record evidence. Justice Scalia joined the majority in seven of
those eight decisions, suggesting that he gives a free ride to Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy when their use of legislative history
either counteracts or anticipates legislative history arguments from pro-
employee dissenters."' One corollary of this apparent free ride is that
majority opinions authored by these three Justices that invoke legislative
history are shaded in a conservative direction. The pro-employer tint may
help explain why conservative Justices' use of legislative history after 1986
appears more ideologically aligned than was true for older conservatives.22
4. Normative Implications of the Scalia Effect
Returning our attention to the liberal Justices, the evidence that Justices
White, Stevens, and Breyer have exercised legislative history restraint to
keep Justice Scalia on board might be understood as an aspect of judicial
collegiality. Liberals have hardly abandoned reliance on legislative history,
but their targeted forbearance may result in fewer fractured rationales for
majority decisions, which may in turn provide clearer rule-of-law guidance
to lower courts and practicing attorneys. One might infer as well that such
collegial adjustments occur primarily if not exclusively when legislative
history performs a supplemental rather than an essential role in the
majority's reasoning. Judges and scholars have written persuasively about
the ameliorating effects of collegiality on an appellate court,2"3 and this may
be an apt illustration.
Stevens, J.); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220-21 (2001) (criticizing
majority opinion by Ginsburg, J.).
210. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242-46 (1992) (Blackmun, J., majority); Torres v.
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1998) (Marshall, J., majority). Justice Scalia was in
dissent in the four remaining majorities authored by liberals that used legislative history to help explain
pro-employer results.
211. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) (Rehnquist, J.); Ansonia
Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.); Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001) (Rehnquist, J); Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (O'Connor, J); Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (O'Connor, J); Alden v. Maine 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Kennedy, J);
Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (Kennedy, J).
212. There may well be other reasons for Justice Scalia's more lenient approach to his conservative
colleagues. He may trust them more than he trusts the liberals at a doctrinal or ideological level, and
therefore be willing to cut them slack in methodological terms. Such an approach would reflect
collegial and/or strategic thinking on Scalia's part.
213. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decisionmaking, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1645-52 (2003); MALTZMAN ET. AL. supra note 190, at 149-52; Paul H. Wahlbeck
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It is difficult to know, however, whether accommodation in this
instance comes at the cost of offering a less persuasive legal justification for
particular decisions. The Court invokes a range of interpretive assets in
virtually every majority opinion. Its inclusion of contextual as well as
textual analysis, and of historical as well as semantic evidence, contributes
to the perception of judicial decisionmaking as rational, principled, and
reasonably transparent. The Court's diversity of interpretive resources also
effectively invites attorneys to advance complex legal arguments, pushing
the Justices toward opinions that are at once objective and nuanced.
In this setting, diminished legislative history usage by the Supreme
Court may have broader implications. If the community of practicing
lawyers and lower federal court judges perceives that the Justices value
legislative history substantially less than they did in the past, this could
encourage lawyers and judges to alter their own approaches to legal
advocacy and judicial reasoning.24 Particularly when the diminished usage
is by liberal Justices who have previously expressed their commitment to
the legitimacy and value of this traditional resource, the Court may be
sending a chilling signal to the legal community.
This possibility-that accommodation of a colleague's intense
methodological preferences is depreciating the value attached to an
interpretive asset-may also affect future developments on the Court with
respect to judicial reasoning. In recent years, Justice Scalia has been
adamant in opposing reliance on foreign law to help justify or explain the
Court's constitutional decisions.2 15 As was the case with legislative history,
Scalia's objections to the use of foreign law as an interpretive resource
invoke considerations of legitimacy, reliability, and politicization.216 Given
some colleagues' apparent response to Scalia's bright-line stance regarding
legislative history, one must at least wonder whether the Court's
willingness to invoke foreign law sources is destined to follow a similar
path.
et. al., Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court, 42
AM. J. POL. S¢I. 294, 296-98, 311-12 (1998).
214. See Maggs, supra note 176, at 73 (predicting that pressure from Justice Scalia may lead to
diminished citation to legislative history by lawyers).
215. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J. dissenting); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002)
(Scalia, J. dissenting). See generally Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119
HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005); Louis H. Pollak, Judging Under the Aegis of the Third Article, 51 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 399, 415-18 (2001).
216. For Justice Scalia's objections based on legitimacy, see Roper, 543 U.S. at 628; Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 598; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48; and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For Scalia's objections based on reliability and politicization, see Roper, 543
U.S. at 623-24 (reliability); 624-27 (politicization). Indeed, Justice Scalia's lengthy discussion in Roper
suggests he is broadening his attacks on foreign law to encompass not simply theoretical concerns about
legitimacy, but also practical arguments based on reliability and political manipulation. This more
comprehensive assault parallels the development of Scalia's critical approach to legislative history. See
Maggs, supra note 176, at 72.
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V.
CONCLUSION
We have attempted to illuminate the nature of the Justices' reliance on
legislative history for an ideologically charged, yet intellectually coherent,
subset of the Court's docket. It is important to reiterate that workplace law
decisions represent a mere one-sixth of the Court's output.2 17 They may
also be a somewhat atypical one-sixth, in that labor and civil rights statutes
are generally long and complex, with substantial legislative history and a
fair amount of evidence that legislative bargains have been important
features. 18 Other statutory decisions, such as the Court's antitrust law or
criminal law cases, may turn out not to rely as often or as robustly on
legislative history. Antitrust statutes tend to be less detailed and more
"common-law like" than laws regulating employer-employee relations, 219
while federal criminal statutes often involve less deal-making and more
unanimity than is typical in the workplace law area.22' This variation
counsels against insisting on a single theoretical framework for legislative
history analysis. Because federal regulatory approaches in other substantive
areas of law may warrant different interpretive assumptions, there is reason
to question the "one size fits all" approach that has characterized recent
debates about the risks and rewards associated with legislative history
reliance.
Moreover, our analysis has sought to explore only how legislative
history is used to justify and explain majority decisions, not whether it
actually accounts for the Justices' substantive positions. We have referred
more than once to subconscious elements of judicial reasoning, but we have
not attempted to decipher the complex mosaic of motives when the Justices
decide to invoke legislative history or any other resource in a particular
majority opinion.221  Assessing and prioritizing the range of personal
values, doctrinal and policy considerations, and principled reasons that
contribute to the opinions of individual Justices would require a more
pointedly biographical approach.
Notwithstanding these caveats, our account of how the Court invokes
this single interpretive resource as part of its reasoning yields valuable
217. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
218. See generally Beth M. Henschen, Judicial Use of Legislative History and Intent in Statutory
Interpretation, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 353, 366 (1985); SHAPIRO, supra note 81, at 110.
219. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1231-36
(2001) (discussing the Sherman Act); Henschen, supra note 218, at 366-67 (discussing the Sherman
Act).
220. See James J. Brudney, Intentionalism's Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001, 1017-19 (2007)
(discussing Title I of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and Title VII of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994).
221. See generally Dan Simon Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look Through the Lens
of Cognitive Psychology, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1097, 1132-37 (2002); Dan Simon, A Psychological Model
of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 14-17, 127-137 (1998).
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insights in both descriptive and normative terms. Such insights can help
furnish guidelines for lower courts, attorneys, and the legal academy
regarding how justifications for doctrinal and policy results are best
rendered in future cases. These insights also help to legitimate judicial
decision-making, which is important in enhancing the Court's acceptability
to the broader public.22
We concluded that over a thirty-seven year period, liberal Justices have
relied on the legislative history of liberal worker-protection statutes in a
surprisingly non-ideological fashion. We explained these results by
identifying three doctrinally-based justifications that regularly arise in
decisions authored by the eight liberal Justices. Each justification relates to
the important role played by legislative history in defining or elaborating on
congressional bargains that were negotiated in the process of enacting the
workplace law statutes and provisions before the Court. At the same time,
we have shown how legislative history is a resource that may itself be
bartered by the Justices, even if implicitly, to assuage a colleague.
That legislative history may be used in both principled and strategic
ways does not distinguish it from other interpretive resources; our prior
findings on the Court's use of the canons of construction have revealed a
mixed and somewhat cautionary bottom line.223 What is noteworthy,
however, is that legislative history reliance appears to be far less politicized
in practice than its critics have maintained, at least when invoked by liberal
Justices in this ideologically focused area of law. Whether the relatively
principled uses reported here can support an argument that legislative
history is preferable to other interpretive assets currently enjoying a more
"neutral" reputation is a question best left for another day.
222. See BAUM, supra note 147, at 97-106, 114-17 (discussing the importance of legal reasoning in
establishing judicial reputation among practicing lawyers, legal academics, and judges from other
courts); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 22, at 157-77 (discussing the impact of legitimacy norms in a
governing Court's relationship with the general public).
223. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 36, at 103-12.
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 173 2008
174 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 29:1
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 174 2008
